Negotiating Business Combination
Agreements--The "Seller's"
Point of View

STEPHEN R. VOLK,' LEWIS H. LEICHER,.. AND
RAYMOND S. KOLOSKI ...

TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
II. THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
A. The Duty of Care . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
B.
The Duty of Loyalty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
III. THE ENTIRE FAIRNESS STANDARD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
IV. UNOCAL SCRUTINY AND REVLON DUTIES . , ... , . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
A.
Unocal Scrutiny .............. , , .......... , .. , , . . .
J. Unocal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2. Time . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3. Unitrin .....................................
B.
Revlon Duties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

I 078
I 079
I 080
I 082
1084
I 086
I 086
1086
1089
1091
1094

• B.A. 1957, Dartmouth College; J.D. 1960, Harvard Law School. Mr. Volk is
a member of the New York bar and Senior Partner of the international law firm
Shearman & Sterling.
•• B.A. 1978, Princeton University; J.D. 1991, University of Chicago School of
Law. Mr. Leicher is a member of the New York bar and an associate with Shearman
& Sterling.
••• B.A. 1986, Tulane University; J.D. 1994, Case Western Reserve University
School of Law. Mr. Koloski is a member of the New York bar and an associate with
Shearman & Sterling. The authors would like to thank their colleagues Christopher D.
Dillon and Alan S. Goudiss for helpful comments on the article. An earlier version of
this article was presented at Northwestern University's 23rd Annual Securities Regulation
Institute.

1077

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

Revlon
Mills .
Barkan
Time .

.
..
.
..

.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.

..
..
..
..

.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.

QVC.......................................

Arnold. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Santa Fe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Mendel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Revlon and the Duty of Care . .
10. Market Checks . . . . . . . . . . . .

.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.

...
...
...
...
...

.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.

V. TRANSACTION PROTECTION MECHANISMS AND RELATED MATTERS . .
A. Generallssues .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .
1. lfRevlonDutiesApply ...... ....................
2. (/Revlon Duties Do Not Apply . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
B. Particular Transaction Protection Mechanisms . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1. Break-Up or Termination Fees and Expense
Reimbursement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2. Lock-Up Stock Options . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3. Voting Lock-Ups with Stockholders . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4. No-Shop and Window Shop Provisions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
5. Asset Lock-Up Options . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
6. Commercial Transactions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
VI. SELECTED PROVISIONS OF THE MERGER AGREEMENT . . . . . . . . . . . .
A. Material Adverse Change Clauses and Related Matters . . . . . . .
B. Due Diligence Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
C. Antitrust Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

I.

1094
I 095
l 097
I 098
1099
1101
1103
1104
I I 07
I I 09
1110
1110
1110
1114
1116
1117
11 I 8
1119
1119
1122
1122
1123
1123
1124
1125

INTRODUCTION

When a public company agrees to enter into a business combination
transaction with another entity, the provisions contained in the agreement
between the parties are designed: (1) to express the economic terms of
the transaction; (2) to set forth the mechanics of the transaction, as
mandated by, or included in response to, applicable law; (3) to create
affirmative duties of each party to the other or, in certain cases, to
specified third party beneficiaries of the agreement; and (4) to allocate
risk between the parties as to various post-signing events or changes.
This Article discusses, from the point of view of a "selling" company,
issues raised by the latter two types of provisions. 1 In particular, Part V
of this Article considers certain "deal protection" provisions, such as
"no-shops," "break-up fees," and "lock-ups," that may be included in a
business combination agreement at the buyer's request in order to reduce
the likelihood of a third party interfering with the contemplated
transaction. Under certain circumstances, the fiduciary duties of the
I. Except where important to the understanding of specific legal doctrines
discussed in this outline, the terms "seller" and "buyer" and their respective variants are
used colloquially to refer to the roles the parties choose.
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board of directors of a selling company limit the availability of such
protections. Accordingly, before discussing specific "deal protection"
mechanisms, Parts II through IV of this Article review certain lines of
cases decided by the Delaware courts regarding the fiduciary duties of
the directors of Delaware corporations. Parts II through V also
summarize the guidance provided by such cases with respect to
structuring the process of investigation and decision making by the
seller's board. The Article concludes, in Part VI, with a discussion of
selected provisions of a business combination agreement that raise
important issues with respect to risk allocation between the parties.

IL

THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE

The business judgment rule reflects the traditional reluctance of the
courts to second-guess business decisions made in good faith by
unconflicted directors. The rule establishes, for purposes of litigation,
a rebuttable presumption that directors acted in good faith and used
appropriate decision-making procedures. In Cinerama, Inc. v. Technicolor, Inc., the Delaware Supreme Court noted that the business judgment
rule "operates as both a procedural guide for litigants and a substantive
rule of law." 2 The Technicolor court continued:
As a procedural guide the business judgment presumption is a rule of evidence
that places the initial burden of proof on the plaintiff. In Cede Il, this Court
described the rule's evidentiary, or procedural, operation as follows:
If a shareholder plaintiff fails to meet this evidentiary burden, the
business-judgment rule attaches to protect corporate officers and directors
and the decisions they make, and our courts will not second-guess these
business judgments. If the rule is rebutted, the burden shifts to the
defendant directors, the proponents of the challenged transaction, to prove
to the trier of fact the "entire fairness" of the transaction to the shareholder plaintiff.
Burden shifting does not create per se liability on the part of the directors.
Rather, it "is a procedure by which the Delaware courts of equity determine
under what standard of review director liability is to be judged. " 3

"From a procedural perspective, the breach of any one of the board's
fiduciary duties is enough to shift the burden of proof to the board to

2. 663 A.2d I 156, 1162 (Del. 1995) (quoting Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc.,
634 A.2d 345, 360 (Del. 1993) (referred to by the Delaware Courts as Cede II), modified
on reargument, 636 A.2d 956 (Del. 1994)).
3. Id. at 1162 (quoting Cede, 634 A.2d at 361, 371) (citations omitted).
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demonstrate entire faimess.',4 As a substantive rule of law, the business
judgment rule provides the applicable standard of review of board
decisions made in accordance with the directors' fiduciary duties of care
and loyalty. The Delaware Supreme Court has stated that:
[I]n cases where the traditional business judgment rule is applicable ... the
Court gives great deference to the substance of the directors' decision and will
not invalidate the decision, will not examine its reasonableness, and "will not
substitute [its] views for those of the board if the latter's decision can be
'attributed to any rational business purpose. "' 5

A.

The Duty of Care

The duty of care requires directors to use appropriate decision-making
procedures. Directors satisfy this requirement principally by informing
themselves "prior to making a business decision, of all material
information reasonably available to them.',6 Under Delaware law, the
standard under which a board's duty of care toward shareholders is
measured is that of gross negligence. 7 If a plaintiff proves that a board
was grossly negligent in the exercise of its duties, then the board is
deemed not to have met its duty of care. 8
In Van Gorkom, for example, the board of directors of the Trans
Union Corporation approved a merger agreement after a twenty-minute
oral presentation by the Chairman of the Board, who failed to explain
the methodology behind determining the merger consideration. The
board did not read the merger agreement, which arrived at the meeting
too late for review. 9 The Van Gorkom court found the Trans Union
board grossly negligent in the exercise of its duty of care. 10
A like conclusion was reached in Cede & Co. v. Technicolor." In
connection with the purchase of Technicolor, Inc. by MacAndrews &
Forbes Group, Technicolor's investment bankers were allowed to speak
with only three Technicolor senior executives in formulating their
fairness opinion. The investment bankers were "told" by Technicolor's
Chief Executive Officer and Chairman of the Board to prepare, within
4. Id. at I 164.
5. Paramount Communications Inc. v. QVC Network Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 45 n.17
(Del. I 993) (quoting Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 949 (Del.
1985), and Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 720 (Del. 1971)).
6. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805,812 (Del. 1984).
7. Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 873 (Del. 1985) (quoting Aronson, 473
A.2d at 812).
8. Id.
9. Id. at 868.
I 0. Id. at 874.
11. Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 345-58 (Del. 1993), modified
on reargument, 636 A.2d 956 (Del. I 994).
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three days, a fairness opinion based on a price of between $20 and
$22. 12 In addition, a notice of a special meeting of Technicolor's board
to approve the $23 per share cash merger did not disclose the reason for
the meeting, and only a few of the directors had received the notice even
one day prior to the meeting; three of the directors had limited
knowledge of the proposed transaction and three of the directors had no
knowledge of the proposed transaction prior to the meeting. 13 At the
special meeting, the merger was approved by the entire board, including
the Chairman, who had negotiated both the merger transaction and an
employment agreement for himself. Additionally, he had sold his shares
of Technicolor stock to MacAndrews. Another Technicolor director who
had been involved in the negotiations stood to receive a $150,000
"finder's fee." The board also approved a stock option in favor of
MacAndrews, the repeal of the supermajority provision in Technicolor's
certificate of incorporation, the employment agreement, and the finder's
fee. Although one Technicolor director suggested other bids be solicited
before agreeing to the proposed transaction, such suggestion was
rejected; the consensus of the board appeared to be "a bird in the hand
was better than a bigger one in the bush." 14 According to the court,
the plaintiff "clearly met its burden of proof ... that the defendant
directors of Technicolor failed to inform themselves fully concerning all
material information prior to approving the merger agreement." 15
In order for the board to protect itself against claims that it violated
the duty of care, it must insist on access to all appropriate information
reasonably available. No matter how comfortable a director may be with
his or her own evaluation of the company, he or she should insist on a
well-documented record, particularly regarding valuation methodology
and the terms, conditions, and background of the proposed transaction,
whether hostile or friendly. In this context, the retention of experienced
investment bankers, both to aid in preparing valuation data and to
provide an independent view on price, is clearly a wise investment. 16

Id. at 361.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 357.
15. Id. at 371; see infra Parts 11.B, III for additional discussions of Technicolor.
I 6. Section 141 (e) of the Delaware General Corporation Law "provides that
directors are protected from a breach of the duty of care when the directors reasonably
believe the information upon which they rely has been presented by an expert 'selected
with reasonable care' and is within that person's 'professional or expert competence."'
12.
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In addition, the board must resist being stampeded with unreasonable
deadlines and should insist on sufficient time to understand thoroughly
the values in the company and the nature and terms of any transaction.
In particular, the board should request the information necessary for it
to evaluate the benefits and detriments of any "transaction protection"
provisions, such as an asset or stock "lock-up," a "no-shop" clause,
"consolation" fees, expense reimbursement provisions, or the absence of
a "fiduciary out." 17 Depending on the circumstances, it may be helpful
for the board, if it is large, to appoint an executive or special committee
to stay fully apprised of developments and negotiations, to provide
guidance to the legal and financial advisors, to participate in the
negotiations, if appropriate, and to provide a report to the full board. In
any event, the board must take an active and participatory role in all
negotiations and decisions. Finally, the board should insist on full
documentation of the steps it took as well as clear articulation of its
reasonmg.
Where exigencies permit, it may be appropriate to separate the board's
deliberations into multiple sessions on separate days. At the first
session, board members should spend as much time as required
becoming familiar with valuation matters and all the terms and
conditions of the transaction, with a full briefing on its genesis and
background. In later sessions, the seller's management and advisors
should answer any remaining questions raised by the directors and the
directors should discuss their evaluations of the transaction and all
alternatives. While the board will necessarily rely greatly on management and advisors to brief it fully on all material facts, the board
members need to be active and thoughtful interrogators. If the board
members are found to have been unaware of material facts which they
could have discovered with reasonable inquiry, they risk failure to satisfy
the due care standard, rendering the decision uninformed. 18

B.

The Duty of Loyalty

The duty of loyalty owed by directors to the shareholders of a
corporation requires directors to act solely for the benefit of the
corporation, affirmatively refraining from any course of action that
would cause the directors to benefit at the expense of the shareholders.

In re Cheyenne Software, Inc. Shareholders Litigation, C.A. 1494 I, Mem. Op. at 5 (Del.
Ch. Nov. 7, 1996).
17. See infra Part V for a discussion of transaction protection mechanisms.
18. See infra Part IV.B.9 for additional discussion of the duty of care, including
further suggestions regarding appropriate board procedures.
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The Delaware courts have described the duty of loyalty as one which
"mandates that the best interest of the corporation and its shareholders
takes precedence over any interest possessed by a director, officer or
controlling shareholder and not shared by the stockholders generally." 19
The members of a board of directors are also deemed to be "selfinterested" in their own election. Accordingly, unilateral actions taken
by a board of directors with the primary purpose of frustrating or
thwarting the free exercise of the stockholder franchise may be found to
violate the duty of loyalty. 20
Whether a director's "self-interest" infects the entire board's decision
to the extent of rebutting the presumption of loyalty, thereby stripping
the board of the benefit of the business judgment rule, was addressed by
Chancellor Allen with respect to the Technicolor transaction:
[A] financial interest in a transaction that is material to one or more directors
less than a majority of those voting is "significant" for burden shifting purposes
... when the interested director controls or dominates the board as a whole or
when the interested director fails to disclose his interest in the transaction to the
board and a reasonable board member would have regarded the existence of the
material interest as a significant fact in the evaluation of the proposed
transaction. 21

In the case of the decision to sell Technicolor to MacAndrews, for
example, the Delaware Court of Chancery found that, with respect to the

19. Id. at 361.
20. See. e.g., Blasius Industries, Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651 (Del. Ch. 1988).
In Blasius, Blasius Industries, the owner of approximately 9% of the outstanding Atlas
Corp. common stock, was attempting to prod the Atlas board into developing and
implementing a restructuring proposal. Id. at 654. Blasius initiated a consent
solicitation seeking to amend the Atlas bylaws to expand the size of the Atlas board
from seven to fifteen members and to elect Blasius nominees to the eight new
directorships. Id. The Atlas board of directors, in an attempt to preempt the consent
solicitation, unilaterally expanded the size of the board to nine members and filled the
new directorships with its own nominees. Id. at 655. Blasius brought an action to
challenge the validity of the board's action. The Court of Chancery held that while such
an action is not invalid per se, the "board bears the heavy burden of demonstrating a
compelling justification for such action." Id. at 661-62. The Court of Chancery found
that the Atlas board did not have such a compelling justification and, notwithstanding
having acted in good faith, had committed an "unintended breach of the duty of loyalty."
Id. at 663. The holding in Blasius is not, however, applicable to actions that affect the
stockholder franchise but that are approved by fully infortned shareholders. See Stroud
v. Grace, 606 A.2d 75, 95 (Del. 1992), and Williams v. Geier, 671 A.2d 1368, 1376
(Del. 1996).
21. Cinerama, Inc. v. Technicolor, Inc., 663 A.2d 1134, 1153 (Del. Ch. 1994),
ajf'd, 663 A.2d 1156 (Del. 1995).
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issues of loyalty, "a large majority of the board of Technicolor was
disinterested and independent ... and neither of those two directors
found or assumed to be interested, dominated or manipulated the process
of board consideration."22 As with a breach of the duty of care, if a
plaintiff meets the burden of proving a breach of the duty of loyalty, the
decision reached by the board of directors will not receive the benefit of
the business judgment rule. Instead, the board will be required to prove
"entire fairness," as described in Part III of this Article. 23
III.

THE ENTIRE FAIRNESS STANDARD

In the event that a shareholder plaintiff is successful in rebutting the
presumption of the business judgment rule by offering evidence that the
directors breached their fiduciary duties, the burden shifts to the directors
to prove that the challenged transaction was "entirely fair" to all
shareholders. 24 The entire fairness standard also applies to decisions
made by "interested" directors (e.g., directors who are on both sides of
a transaction or have a financial interest not shared by stockholders
generally). A determination that a board of directors failed to demonstrate the entire fairness of a transaction will lead to substantive
liability. 25
As demonstrated by the holding in Technicolor that the transaction in
question was entirely fair, "an initial judicial determination that a given
breach of a board's fiduciary duties has rebutted the presumption of the

22. Id. at 1151.
23. The fiduciary duties of the board of directors of a Delaware corporation also
include a "duty of candor," pursuant to which directors must '"disclose fully and fairly
all material information within the board's control when it seeks shareholder action.'
The obligation attaches to proxy statements and any other disclosures in contemplation
of stockholder action. The essential inquiry is whether the alleged omission or
misrepresentation is material." Arnold v. Soc'y for Sav. Bancorp, Inc., 650 A.2d 1270,
1277 (Del. 1994) (citations omitted) (quoting Stroud v. Grace, 606 A.2d 75, 84 (Del.
I 992)). The Arnold court described the applicable materiality standard as follows:
An omitted fact is material if there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable
shareholder would consider it important in deciding how to vote. . . . It does
not require proof of a substantial likelihood that disclosure of the omitted fact
would have caused a reasonable investor to change his vote. What the
standard does contemplate is a showing of a substantial likelihood that, under
all the circumstances, the omitted fact would have assumed actual significance
in the deliberations of the reasonable shareholder.
Id. at 1277 (quoting TSC Indus. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438,449 (1976), which was
adopted as the Delaware standard in Rosenblatt v. Getty Oil Co., 493 A.2d 929, 944
(Del. 1985)). For a comprehensive examination of the Delaware cases regarding a
director's disclosure duties, see Hamermesh, Calling Off the Lynch Mob: The Corporate
Director's Fiduciary Disclosure Duty, 49 VAND. L. REV. I 087 (1996).
24. Cinerama, Inc. v. Technicolor, Inc., 663 A.2d 1156, 1162 (Del. 1995).
25. Id. at 1163.
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business judgment rule does not preclude a subsequent determination that
the board action was entirely fair, and is, therefore, not outcomedeterminative per se."26 It should be noted, however, that "[b]ecause
the effect of the proper invocation of the business judgment rule is so
powerful and the standard of entire fairness so exacting, the determination of the appropriate standard of judicial review frequently is
determinative of the outcome of litigation."27 "To avoid substantive
liability, notwithstanding the quantum of adverse evidence that has
defeated the business judgment rule's protective procedural presumption,
the board will have to demonstrate entire fairness by presenting evidence
of the cumulative manner by which it otherwise discharged all of its
fiduciary duties. "28
Because the Delaware courts do not defer to the business judgment of
the directors in cases that apply the entire fairness standard, the holdings
and dicta of such cases provide important guidance for boards regarding
how to structure the process of reviewing a business combination
transaction in order to meet their fiduciary duties. The standard itself
was explained by the Delaware Supreme Court in Weinberger:
The concept of fairness has two basic aspects: fair dealing and fair price. The
former embraces questions of when the transaction was timed, how it was
initiated, structured, negotiated, disclosed to directors, and how the approvals
of the directors and the stockholders were obtained. The latter aspect of
fairness relates to the economic and financial considerations of the proposed
merger, including all relevant factors: assets, market value, earnings, future
prospects, and any other elements that affect the intrinsic or inherent value of
a company's stock. . . . However, the test for fairness is not a bifurcated one
as between fair dealing and price. All aspects of the issue must be examined
as a whole since the question is one of entire fairness. 29

Although demanding, an entire fairness test does not require perfection
on the part of the board. The chancery court's finding that the
Technicolor transaction was entirely fair to the shareholders, a decision

26. Id.; see also Kahn v. Lynch Communication Systems, Inc., 1995 Del. Ch.
LEXIS 44 (Del. Ch. Apr. 17, 1995), aff'd, 669 A.2d 79 (Del. 1995); Rabkin v. Olin
Corp., 16 DEL. J. CORP. L. 851 (Del. Ch. 1990), ajf'd, 586 A.2d 1202 (Del. 1990);
Shamrock Holdings, Inc. v. Polaroid, 559 A.2d 257 (Del. Ch. 1989).
27. Technicolor, 663 A.2d at 1163 n.8 (quoting AC Acquisitions Corp. v.
Anderson, Clayton & Co., 519 A.2d 103, 111 (Del. Ch. 1986)).
28. Id. at 1163.
29. Id. at 1162-63 (quoting Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 711 (Del.
1983)).
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ultimately affirmed by the Delaware Supreme Court, rested on the
following basis:
( I) CEO Kamerman consistently sought the highest price that Perelman would
pay; (2) Kamerman was better informed about the strengths and weaknesses of
Technicolor as a business than anyone else ... ; (3) Kamerman and later the
board were advised by firms who were among the best in the country; (4) the
negotiations led to a price that was very high when compared to the prior
market price of the stock (about a 100% premium over unaffected market price)
... ; (5) while the company was not shopped there is no indication in the
record that more money was possible from Mr. Perelman or likely from anyone
else; rand] management declined to do an MBO transaction at a higher price.
,,3b

The fact that a majority of the board was disinterested and the material
conflict of the one interested director had been disclosed, combined with
the process of considering and negotiating the transaction and the price
paid, led to the determination that the transaction was entirely fair. 31
IV.

UNOCAL SCRUTINY AND REVLON DUTIES

Under certain circumstances, the Delaware courts will not afford the
board of directors of a corporation the benefit of the business judgment
rule without certain additional tests being met. In the case of board
action with respect to (a) defensive measures taken unilaterally by the
board in response to a threat to corporate control or effectiveness, or (b)
a transaction involving a sale of control or the breakup of the company,
Delaware courts will examine, using certain specific tests, the reasonableness of the board's actions.
A.

Unocal Scrutiny
1. Unocal
Before applying the business judgment rule to a board decision
concerning defensive measures employed against a threatened takeover,
Delaware courts require that the actions of the board of directors meet
a two-pronged test first articulated in Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum
Co. 32 Unocal involved an exchange offer by Unocal Corporation for
its own shares in order to defend against a hostile acquisition by Mesa
Petroleum Company. 33 Mesa, which held approximately 13% of
Unocal 's outstanding common stock, proposed a two-tiered, front-end

30. Cinerama, Inc. v. Technicolor, Inc., 663 A.2d 1134, 1140 (Del. Ch. 1994),
ajf'd, 663 A.2d I 156 (Del. 1995).
31. Id. at 1144.
32. 493 A.2d 946, 954-55 (Del. 1985).
33. Id.
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loaded merger, whereby Mesa would purchase approximately 37% of
Unocal 's outstanding common stock in a tender offer for $54 per share
in cash. The remaining shareholders of Unocal would then exchange
their shares for back-end merger consideration consisting of highly
subordinated securities purportedly worth $54 per share. After rejecting
the Mesa offer, the Unocal board approved an exchange offer, conditioned upon Mesa acquiring the shares it had tendered for, pursuant to
which the remaining 49% of the outstanding Unocal shares would be
exchanged for $72 per share in senior debt securities of Unocal. The
board excluded Mesa from participating in the exchange offer in order
to avoid displacing other stockholders from the opportunity to have a
greater number of their shares repurchased and to keep from financing
Mesa's "inadequate" proposal. Mesa then sued to enjoin the self-tender
and its exclusion therefrom, charging that the discriminatory self-tender
was a breach of the directors' fiduciary duties. 34
In determining whether the board of directors possessed the power and
the duty to take defensive measures to protect against a perceived threat
to the corporation, the Unocal court stated:
When a board addresses a pending takeover bid it has an obligation to
determine whether the offer is in the best interests of the corporation and its
shareholders. In that respect a board's duty is no different from any other
responsibility it shoulders, and its decisions should be no less entitled to the
respect they otherwise would be accorded in the realm of business judgment.
There are, however, certain caveats to a proper exercise of this function.
Because of the omnipresent specter that a board may be acting primarily in its
own interests, rather than those of the corporation and its shareholders, there is
an enhanced duty which calls for judicial examination at the threshold before
the protections of the business judgment rule may be conferred.
In the face of this inherent conflict directors must show that they had
reasonable grounds for believing that a danger to corporate policy and
effectiveness existed because of another person's stock ownership. However,
they satisfy that burden "by showing good faith and reasonable investigation .
. . ." Furthermore, such proof is materially enhanced, as here, by the approval
of a board comprised of a majority of outside independent directors who have
acted in accordance with the foregoing standards. 3

The court further held that:
The standard of proof established in Cheff v. Mathes as discussed supra ... is
designed to ensure that a defensive measure to thwart or impede a takeover is

34. Id. at 949-51.
35. Id. at 954-55 (citations omitted) (quoting Cheffv. Mathes, 199 A.2d 548, 55455 (Del. I 964)).
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indeed motivated by a good faith concern for the welfare of the corporation and
its stockholders, which in all circwnstances must be free of any fraud or other
misconduct. However, this does not end the inquiry.
A further aspect is the element of balance. If a defensive measure is to come
within the ambit of the business judgment rule, it must be reasonable in relation
to the threat posed. This entails an analysis by the directors of the nature of the
takeover bid and its effect on the corporate enterprise. Examples of such
concerns may include: inadequacy of the price offered, nature and timing of
the offer, questions of illegality, the impact on "constituencies" other than
shareholders (e.g., creditors, customers, employees, and perhaps even the
community generally), the risk of nonconsummation, and the quality of
securities being offered in the exchange. 36

Thus, under Unocal, a board must prove that (i) the board reasonably
believed, after due investigation, that the corporate enterprise was in fact
threatened and (ii) the defensive measures undertaken to protect the
corporation were reasonable in relation to the perceived threat.
According to Unocal and its progeny, if the first prong is satisfied, the
scrutiny of a court turns to the second prong, which requires an objective
analysis of the proportionality of the response.
In applying the first prong in the Unocal case, the court noted that the
Unocal directors had determined that the company was worth substantially more than the $54 per share in cash offered in the front-end tender,
and that the back-end of Mesa's proposed merger was worth far less
than $54. The court further stated:
It is now well recognized that [two-tier] offers are a classic coercive measure
designed to stampede shareholders into tendering at the first tier, even if the
price is inadequate, out of fear of what they will receive at the back end of the
transaction. Wholly beyond the coercive aspect of an inadequate two-tiered
tender offer, the threat was posed by a corporate raider with a national
reputation as a "greenrnailer. " 3

The court found that the Unocal board had, in good faith and with
reasonable investigation, determined that Mesa's offer posed a threat to
Unocal 's corporate policy and effectiveness. With respect to the
balancing required under the second prong, the Unocal court found that,
given the coercive nature of the Mesa tender offer and the fact that
allowing Mesa to participate in the exchange offer would "effectively
subsidize" Mesa's tender offer, the selective exchange offer was
reasonable in relation to the threat posed. 38 The dual goals of the
exchange offer, to defeat the inadequate Mesa offer and to provide at
least 49% of Unocal 's shareholders with adequate value for their shares

36.

37.
38.
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if the Mesa transaction was consummated, were found valid by the
court. 39
2.

Time

In litigation stemming from the battle for control of Time Inc., the
Delaware Supreme Court held that Time's tender offer for Warner
Communication's stock was a reasonable response to the threat posed by
Paramount Communication's tender offer for Time stock. 40 Prior to
Paramount's tender offer, Time and Warner had agreed to a stock-forstock merger whereby Warner would be merged into a Time subsidiary
and Warner and Time shareholders would receive 62% and 38%,
respectively, of the combined entity. The merger, touted as a "merger
of equals," was the result of a several year process during which Time
sought an alliance in order to pursue its long-term strategy of combining
its "distribution" capacity with a company with a strong "content"
capability. 41
That strategy, however, was tempered by Time
management's requirement that the "Time culture," including its
commitment to journalistic integrity, be preserved. The Time-Warner
merger was structured so as to provide Time sufficient comfort as to the
preservation of the "Time culture."42
However, on June 7, 1989, two weeks after Time had sent out a proxy
to its shareholders,43 Paramount announced an all-cash offer for Time
shares at $175 per share. Time refused to negotiate with Paramount, the
Time board deeming the offer inadequate both as to price and Time's
long-term strategy. While the Time board's members believed that its
shareholders "would not comprehend the long-term benefits of the
Warner merger," the board was resolved to fight the perceived Para-

39. Id. at 957.
40. Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1154-55 (Del.
1989).
41. Id. at 1145-46.
42. Id. at 1144 n.4.
43. Pursuant to New York Stock Exchange Rules, the exchange on which the Time
shares were traded, the affirmative vote of a majority of Time shareholders was required
in order to effect the issuance of the shares required to complete the Time-Warner
merger. See New York Stock Exchange Listed Company Manual, Section 312.03. Time
requested the New York Stock Exchange to alter its rules and allow the Time-Warner
merger to proceed without stockholder approval, but such request was rejected. Id. at
1148.
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mount threat because "[t]he board's prevailing belief was that
Paramount's bid proposed a threat to Time's control of its own destiny"
and "that a combination with Warner offered greater potential for
Time."44 Time's board also restructured the proposed merger with
Warner whereby Time would make an all-cash offer for 51 % of
Warner's stock at $70 per share with back-end merger consideration of
cash and stock. 45 When Paramount raised its offer to $200 in cash per
Time share, the Time board refused the offer, again citing inadequate
price, the threat to the Time culture and long-term strategy, and other
conditions to Paramount's offer, including the removal of potential
regulatory and legal constraints that clouded the certainty of the
proposed merger's consummation. 46
In addressing the application of the Unocal standard, the Delaware
Supreme Court began by noting that it was not the role of the court to
pass on the "wisdom" of the Time board's decision, but whether, as the
lower court had concluded, "the initial Time-Warner agreement was the
product of a proper exercise of business judgment."47 Focusing on
Time's long and deliberate search for a business combination that would
enhance Time's long-term strategy and protect the "Time culture," the
court found "ample" evidence that the original stock-for-stock "merger
with Warner was entitled to the protection of the business judgment
rule."48 With respect to the revised merger agreement, however, there
was no doubt that the actions of the Time board would be judged under
the Unocal standard. The court rejected Paramount's argument that an
all-cash tender offer for all shares that is reasonably within a range of
values that would be acceptable to shareholders cannot be a threat to a
corporation and its shareholders. 49
The court thereby rejected
Paramount's argument "that a hostile tender offer can pose only two
types of threats: the threat of coercion that results from a two-tier offer
promising unequal treatment for non-tendering shareholders; and the
threat of inadequate value from an all-shares, all-cash offer at a price
below what a target board in good faith deems to be the present value
of its shares. " 50 To do so, the court maintained, would be to substitute
the judgment of the court for the judgment of the board of directors as
to which deal was "better. " 51

44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
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With respect to the second prong of the Unocal test, the court noted
that "[t]he fiduciary duty to manage a corporate enterprise includes the
selection of a time frame for achievement of corporate goals," which
may not be delegated by the directors to the shareholders. 52 "Directors
are not obliged to abandon a deliberately conceived corporate plan for
a short-term shareholder rrofit unless there is clearly no basis to sustain
the corporate strategy." 5 Because there existed a basis to sustain
Time's corporate strategy, including its choice of Warner as favored
merger partner, the defensive restructuring of the Time-Warner merger
was deemed reasonable in response to the perceived threat. In addition,
the finding of proportionality was also supported by the fact that
Paramount could, if it chose to do so, seek to acquire the combined
Time/Warner entity. 54
3.

Unitrin

In early 1995, the Delaware Supreme Court revisited the second prong
of the Unocal standard in Unitrin, Inc. v. American General Corp. 55
The case arose from American General Corporation's unsolicited offer
to acquire all of the outstanding common stock of Unitrin, Inc. for $503/e
per share in cash, a 30% premium to the market price. American
General also indicated that it would be willing to negotiate a higher
price. Unitrin's financial advisors concluded that the American General
offer was inadequate but did not provide a range of values that might
have facilitated negotiations with American General for an appropriate
price. The Unitrin board then officially rejected the American General
offer. After American General publicly announced its offer, the Unitrin
board adopted a "poison pill" and amended Unitrin's by-laws to require
60 days' advance notice of a shareholder's intention to nominate board
members or submit proposals for consideration at an annual
stockholders' meeting. Most importantly, one week later, the board
authorized the repurchase of up to ten million shares of its own stock on
the open market using approximately $500 million of corporate funds
(the "Repurchase Program"). Prior to giving effect to the Repurchase

52.
53.
54.

55.

Id. at 1154.
Id. (citation omitted).
See infra Part IV.B for the application of Revlon to the Time/Warner merger.
651 A.2d 1361, 1367 (Del. 1995).
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Program, a group of Unitrin directors controlled approximately 23% of
the Unitrin common stock. After giving effect to the proposed buyback, such directors would have controlled approximately 28% of the
common stock. Given that Unitrin's certificate of incorporation required
a supermajority vote of 75% of the stockholders to approve any merger
not supported by the board of directors, American General contended
that the Unitrin board would have had effective veto power over any
proposed merger.
The Delaware Court of Chancery determined that, given the existence
of the "poison pill" defense, the Repurchase Program was a disproportionate response to the "mild" threat posed by American General's
negotiable, all-cash/all-shares offer. 56 The Delaware Supreme Court,
however, concluded that the lower court "applied an incorrect legal
standard when it ruled that the Unitrin board's decision to authorize the
Repurchase Program was disproportionate because it was 'unnecessary. "' 57 The supreme court then noted that:
[A] court applying enhanced judicial scrutiny should be deciding whether the
directors made a reasonable decision, not a perfect decision. If a board
selected one of several reasonable alternatives, a court should not second guess
that choice even though it might have decided otherwise or subsequent events
may have cast doubt on the board's determination. Thus, courts will not
substitute their business judgment for that of the directors, but will determine
if the directors' decision was, on balance, within a range of reasonableness. 58

The supreme court then described the second prong of Unocal as
follows: "If a defensive measure is not draconian, however, because it
is not either coercive or preclusive, the Unocal proportionality test
requires the focus of enhanced judicial scrutiny to shift to 'the range of
reasonableness. "'59
In applying the first prong of Unocal, the supreme court identified the
threat reasonably perceived by the Unitrin directors as "substantive
coercion, i.e., that Unitrin's shareholders might accept American
General's inadequate Offer because of 'ignorance or mistaken belief'
regarding the Board's assessment of the long-term value of Unitrin's
stock." 60 In applying the second prong, the supreme court stated that
there was no showing on the record that the Repurchase Program was
coercive. The supreme court remanded the case to the Court of

56. In re Unitrin, Inc. Shareholders Litig., I994 WL 698453, at *2, • I 9 (Del. Ch.
Oct. I 3, 1994).
57. Unitrin, 651 A.2d at 1385.
58. Id. at 1385-86 (quoting Paramount Communications Inc. v. QVC Network Inc.,
637 A.2d 34, 45-46 (Del 1993) (citations omitted)).
59. Id. at 1387-88 (quoting QVC, 637 A.2d at 45-46).
60. Unitrin, 651 A.2d at 1385 (citations omitted).
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Chancery for a determination of whether the Repurchase Program was
preclusive and, if not, whether it was within a range of reasonableness.
The supreme court directed the Court of Chancery to focus on "whether
Unitrin's Repurchase Program would only inhibit American General's
ability to wage a proxy fight and institute a merger or whether it was,
in fact, preclusive because American General's success would either be
mathematically impossible or realistically unattainable."61 Earlier in the
opinion, the supreme court had concluded, based on certain assumptions,
that the record appeared to reflect that American General could still
undertake a proxy contest to gain the power to combine the two
companies. The court stated that if American General was to initiate a
proxy contest before acquiring 15% of Unitrin's stock, it would need to
amass only 45.1 % of the votes assuming a 90% voter turnout. If it
commenced a tender offer at an attractive price contemporaneously with
its proxy contest, it could seek to acquire 50.1 % of the outstanding
voting stock. 62 The supreme court took issue with "the Court of
Chancery's sua sponte determination that Unitrin's outside directors,
who are also substantial stockholders, would not vote like other
stockholders in a proxy contest, i.e., in their own best economic
interests."63 In particular, the supreme court found that the Court of
Chancery's determination that "the stockholder directors of Unitrin
would reject an 'excellent offer,' unless it compensated them for giving
up the 'prestige and perquisites' of directorship, appears to be subjective
and without record support. It cannot be presumed."64 The supreme
court also noted, approvingly, that the board's conclusion that "a
Repurchase Program would provide additional liquidity to those
stockholders who wished to realize short-term gain, and would provide
enhanced value to those stockholders who wished to maintain a longterm investment."65 The supreme court directed the Court of Chancery,
if it reached consideration of whether the Repurchase Propam was
within a range of reasonableness, to take this into account. 6 Also to
be taken into account were "whether (I) [the Repurchase Program] is a
statutorily authorized form of business decision which a board of
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.

Id. at 1388-89.
Id. at 1382-83.
Id. at 1380.
Id.
Id. at 1384.
Id. at 1389.
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directors may routinely make in a non-takeover context; (2) as a
defensive response to American General's Offer it was limited and
corresponded in degree or magnitude to the degree or magnitude of the
threat (i.e., assuming the threat was relatively 'mild,' was the response
relatively 'mild?') ...." 67
B.

Revlon Duties
1.

Revlon

Under Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 68 and
its progeny, the duties of the board of directors are, in certain circumstances, conclusively deemed to be concerned solely with maximizing
short-term shareholder value. One such circumstance is a transaction
that will result in a change of control of the "selling" company, such a
transaction being the last opportunity for current shareholders to receive
a control premium for their shares even if they retain an equity interest
in the entity resulting from the transaction. Other such circumstances
include: (i) when a corporation initiates an active bidding process
seeking to sell itself or to effect a business reorganization involving a
clear breakup of the company and (ii) when, in response to a bidder's
offer, a target abandons its long-term strategy and seeks an alternative
transaction involving the breakup of the company. According to the
Delaware Supreme Court, the decision by the board of Revlon to end the
active bidding process between Pantry Pride and Forstmann Little by
granting Forstmann Little the right to purchase certain "crown jewels"
of Revlon, a no-shop provision and a $25 million breakup fee was a
breach of the Revlon board members' fiduciary duties. The fiduciary
duties were breached when, as a result of increasing bids from Pantry
Pride, it became apparent that the break-up of the company was
inevitable. 69 According to the Revlon court:
The Revlon board's authorization permitting management to negotiate a merger
or buyout with a third party was a recognition that the company was for sale.
The duty of the board had thus changed from the preservation of Revlon as a
corporate entity to the maximization of the company's value at a sale for the

67.

Id. For a later case applying the Unitrin analysis to the second Unocal prong,

see Moore Corporation Limited v. Wallace Computer Services, Inc., 907 F. Supp. 1545,
1463 (D. Del. 1995) (retention of poison pill by Wallace after receipt of all-cash/allshares offer found not to be preclusive or coercive because Moore could pursue a proxy
contest to replace target board and found to be within the range of reasonableness
because the Board of Directors of Wallace reasonably believed that shareholders were
entitled to protection from what they determined was a "low ball" offer).
68. 506 A.2d 173 (Del. I 986).
69. Id. at 182.
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stockholders' benefit. This significantly altered the board's responsibilities
under the Unocal standards. It no longer faced threats to corporate policy and
effectiveness, or to the stockholders' interests, from a grossly inadequate bid.
The whole question of defensive measures became moot. The directors' role
changed from defenders of the corporate bastion to auctioneers charged with
getting the best price for the stockholders at a sale of the company. 70

The Revlon court did, however, note that lock-ups and related agreements are not prohibited under Delaware law when approved in
accordance with directors' fiduciary duties. 71
2.

Mills

In Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc., 72 the Delaware Supreme
Court applied Revlon and an entire fairness standard to enjoin an asset
lock-up and a no-shop agreement granted to a bidder in connection with
a slightly superior bid at the end of an "unfair" auction. The court went
on to find that, in general, the Unocal standard of review would apply
to decisions of the board of directors on the manner in which to conduct
an auction governed by Revlon. An offer by Robert Maxwell was
competing against a management buy-out led by Kohlberg Kravis,
Roberts & Co (KKR). The Mills court described the board's Revlon
duties by stating: "[T]he proper objective of Macmillan's fiduciaries
was to obtain the highest price reasonably available for the company,
provided it was offered by a reputable and responsible bidder."73
The court found that the auction process was "clandestinely and
impermissibly skewed in favor of KKR." 74 KKR had been given, after
executing a confidentiality agreement, "detailed, non-public, financial
information of Macmillan, culminating in a series of formal 'due
diligence' presentations to KKR representatives by Macmillan senior
management ...." 75 Maxwell, however, did not enjoy the same level
of contact with Macmillan. In fact, Macmillan did not respond at all to
Maxwell's offer. In order to force the issue, Maxwell launched a tender
offer at $80 per share, subject to receiving the same information that had
been provided to KKR. Maxwell subsequently contacted Macmillan to

70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.

Id.
Id. at 176.
559 A.2d 1261 (Del. 1988).
Id. at 1282 (citations omitted).
Id. at 1281.
Id. at 1272.
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discuss the possibility of brokering a friendly merger or the purchase of
Macmillan's information business for $1 billion. "Significantly, no
Macmillan representative ever attempted to negotiate with Maxwell on
any of these matters." 76 Further, Maxwell was not provided the same
detailed information on Macmillan until almost two months after KKR
was afforded such contact. Finally, while the chief executive officer of
Macmillan suggested to KKR that Macmillan's management "endorse
the concept and structure of the buyout to the board of directors, even
though KKR had not yet disclosed ... the amount of its bid," Maxwell
was given less than 24 hours to prepare his bid before the auction was
closed. 77 According to the court, the Macmillan board favored the
KKR buyout in order to benefit management, in breach of the board's
fiduciary duties under Revlon.
The final KKR bid was slightly higher than Maxwell's, but required
agreement to no-shop language, the grant of a lock-up option on certain
crown jewels, and the execution of a definitive merger agreement by the
next day. No such conditions were contained in the Maxwell bid. The
special committee selected KKR as the winner and a merger agreement
was signed. A later bid by Maxwell that was slightly higher than the
KKR offer that was accepted was rejected because it was conditioned
upon the invalidation of the asset lock-up.
The Delaware Court of Chancery enjoined the operation of
Macmillan's poison pill in order to permit shareholders to consider both
offers, but held that the asset lock-up and the break-up fee and expenses
were reasonable, since Maxwell had an opportunity to submit his highest
offer in the auction process. 78 The Delaware Supreme Court affirmed
the injunction against the poison pill, but reversed the failure to grant an
injunction against the lock-up option and the fees because the auction
was flawed. The supreme court indicated that the board should have
recognized that the various procedural biases in favor of KKR could
have acted to prevent Maxwell from submitting his highest bid. In
addition, the court found that agreement to the option and fees was
unjustified in light of the minor differences between the two bids. The
court emphasized that where the playing field is tipped in favor of one
bidder over another, such action must be "reasonable in relation to the
advantage sought to be achieved or, conversely, to the threat which a
particular bid allegedly poses to stockholder interests."79

Id.
Id. at 1273.
78. Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc., 1988 WL I 08332 (Del. Ch. Oct. 18,
1988), ajf'd in part, rev'd in part, 559 A.2d 1261 (Del. 1988).
79. Id. at 1288 (citation omitted).
76.
77.
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3.

Barkan

In Barkan v. Amsted Industries Inc., plaintiff shareholders claimed that
the directors of Amsted had breached their Revlon duties in approving
a management buyout involving an employee stock option plan. The
management buyout was approved by a special committee of the board
of directors, after the special committee negotiated an increase in the
cash portion of the merger consideration. The Delaware Supreme Court
noted that: "Although the Special Committee was given the power to
evaluate the fairness of any acquisition proposal made by a third party,
the Committee was instructed not to engage in an active search for
alternatives to an MBO." 80 The Delaware Supreme Court affirmed a
Delaware Court of Chancery decision approving the settlement of
lawsuits challenging a management buyout of Amsted. While the
special committee did not actively seek other competing bids prior to
approving the management buyout, the record reflected that the
investment community had known for several months that Amsted was
"in play" and no other bids had been received. Further, a stockholder
rights plan had been removed five weeks prior to the consummation of
the management buyout transaction. The plaintiff shareholders claimed
that the selling process was not designed to obtain the highest price
available for Amsted and that the requirements of Revlon had thus not
been satisfied. The Delaware Supreme Court stated that:
Revlon does not demand that every change in the control of a Delaware
corporation he preceded by a heated bidding contest. Revlon is merely one of
an unbroken line of cases that seek to prevent the conflicts of interest that arise
in the field of mergers and acquisitions by demanding that directors act with
scrupulous concern for fairness to shareholders. When multiple bidders are
competing for control, this concern for fairness forbids directors from using
defensive mechanisms to thwart an auction or to favor one bidder over another.
When the board is considering a single offer and has no reliable grounds upon
which to judge its adequacy, this concern for fairness demands a canvas of the
market to determine if higher bids may be elicited. When, however, the
directors possess a body of reliable evidence with which to evaluate the fairness
of a transaction, they may approve that transaction without conducting an active
survey of the market. As the Chancellor recognized, the circumstances in
which this passive approach is acceptable are limited. "A decent respect for
reality forces one to admit that ... advice [of an investment banker] is
frequently a pale substitute for the dependable infonnation that a canvas of the

80.

567 A.2d 1279, 1282 (Del. 1989).
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relevant market can provide." The need for adequate information is central to
the enlightened evaluation of a transaction that a board must make. Nevertheless, there is no single method that a board must employ to acquire such
information. 81

The supreme court affirmed the court of chancery's holding that
Amsted's directors had "acted in good faith to arrange the best possible
transaction for shareholders."82 Later in its opinion, the supreme court
further limited its holding as follows:
We certainly do not condone in all instances the imposition of the sort of "no
shop" restriction that bound Amsted's Special Committee. Where a board has
no reasonable basis upon which to judge the adequacy of a contemplated
transaction, a no-shop restriction gives rise to the inference that the board seeks
to forestall competing bids. Even here, a judicious market survey might have
been desirable . . . . [W)e decline to fashion an iron-clad rule for determining
when a market test is not required. The evidence that will support a finding of
good faith in the absence of some sort of market test is by nature circumstantial; therefore, its evaluation by a court must be open-textured. However, the
crucial element supporting a finding of good faith is knowledge. It must be
clear that the board had sufficient knowledge of relevant markets to form the
basis for its belief that it acted in the best interests of the shareholders. The
situations in which a completely passive approach to acquiring such knowledge
is appropriate are limited. 83

4.

Time

In Time, it was argued that Revlon duties were triggered as a result of
the Time-Warner stock-for-stock merger agreement (pursuant to which
Warner stockholders would own 62% of the combined entity). 84 The
Delaware Court of Chancery rejected the Revlon claim, finding that there
was no change of control because control of both Time and the new
Time-Warner would be in "a fluid aggregation of unaffiliated shareholders representing a voting majority-in other words, in the market." 85
In affirming the chancery court's holding, the Delaware Supreme Court
focused on the fact that, as opposed to the circumstances in Revlon, the
dissolution or break-up of Time did not become inevitable upon either
the commencement of merger negotiations with Warner or the recasting
of the merger structure. 86 Furthermore, the court noted that Paramount
was not foreclosed from making a bid for the combined Time-Warner
entity and that, therefore, the shareholders were not foreclosed perma-

81. Id. at 1286-87 (alteration in original) (citations omitted) (quoting In re Amsted
Indus. Litig., 1988 WL 92736, at *7 (Del. Ch. Aug. 24, 1988)).
82. Id. at 1287; see infra Part IV.B.10 for additional discussion of market checks.
83. Id. at 1288.
84. Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1989).
85. Id. at 1150 (quoting the Chancellor's conclusion).
86. Id.
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nently from enjoying a control premium, two circumstances which
warrant application of Revlon duties. The court also rejected an
argument by the plaintiffs that use of deal protection mechanisms, such
as a lock-up agreement and a no-shop clause, prevented shareholders
from obtaining a control premium in the immediate future and thus
violated Revlon. The court stated:
We agree with the Chancellor that such evidence is entirely insufficient to
invoke Revlon duties; and we decline to extend Revlon's application to
corporate transactions simply because they might be construed as putting a
corporation "in play" or "up for sale." The adoption of structural safety devices
alone does not trigger Revlon. Rather, as the Chancellor stated, such devices
are properly subject to a Unocal analysis. 87

5.

QVC

In Paramount Communications Inc. v. QVC Network Inc., 88 the
Delaware Supreme Court affirmed a lower court decision that a proposed
stock-for-stock merger between Paramount and Viacom Inc. triggered
Revlon duties because the controlling stockholder of Viacom would own
approximately 70% of the voting securities of the combined company
after the merger. The court distinguished Time based on the fact that
both before and after the Time/Warner merger, Time was owned by "a
fluid aggregation of unaffiliated stockholders." 89 In contrast, the
proposed Paramount/Viacom merger would have shifted "control of
Paramount from the public stockholders to a controlling shareholder.
90
• • •"
The supreme court noted that: "Once control has shifted, the
current Paramount stockholders will have no leverage in the future to
demand another control premium. As a result, the Paramount stockhold-

87.

Id. at I 151 (citations omitted).
637 A.2d 34 (Del. 1993).
Id. at 46.
90. Id. at 48. The QVC court noted that it was deciding only the case before it,
a case "which, on its facts, is clearly controlled by established Delaware law. Here, the
proposed change of control and the implications thereof were crystal clear." Id. at 51.
A test for a "change of control" for purposes of Revlon has not been articulated. In light
of the Delaware courts' stated concern with maintaining the opportunity for public
stockholders of the combined company to receive a control premium (notwithstanding
the existence of a privately-held block of shares), it is not clear what form such a
"change of control" test would take.
88.
89.
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ers are entitled to receive, and should receive, a control premium and/or
protective devices of significant value."91
The following is a brief summary of the facts in QVC. After several
months of on and off negotiations, Paramount and Viacom agreed to a
stock-for-stock merger. Under the terms of the proposed September
1993 Paramount/Viacom merger agreement, shares of Paramount
common stock would have been converted into .10 shares of Viacom
Class A voting stock and .90 shares of Viacom Class B nonvoting stock
and $9.10 in cash (a value of approximately $69 per share). Upon
consummation of the merger, the controlling shareholder of Viacom
would have owned approximately 70% of the voting securities of the
combined ParamountNiacom entity. After the announcement of the
Paramount/Viacom merger, QVC Network, which had previously
expressed an interest in Paramount, contacted Paramount and offered
.893 shares of QVC common stock and $30 in cash for each share of
Paramount common stock (a value of approximately $80 per share). At
a meeting of the Paramount board of directors called to discuss the QVC
offer, the board's members were instructed by Paramount's Chairman
and CEO that, under the terms of the "no-shop" provision of the
Paramount/Viacom agreement, Paramount was restricted from negotiating with QVC until QVC provided evidence of its ability to finance the
merger. After QVC provided such evidence, the Paramount board
authorized management to meet with QVC. QVC subsequently
announced a tender offer for 50 .1 % of Paramount 's outstanding common
stock at $80 per share in cash. In the second step of the merger, each
remaining share of Paramount common stock would be converted into
1.42875 shares of QVC common stock. In response to the competing
QVC bid, Paramount and Viacom renegotiated their proposed merger
and agreed to an $80 cash bid by Viacom for 50.1 % of Paramount
common stock, and a second-step merger that would convert each
remaining Paramount share into .20408 shares of Viacom Class A voting
stock, 1.08317 shares of Viacom Class B nonvoting stock, and .20408
shares of a new series of Viacom convertible preferred stock. After both
Viacom and QVC had launched their respective tender offers, Viacom
raised the cash portion of its bid to $85 per share, with a similar increase

91. Id. at 43. The court, while expressing no opmton on the effect such
"protective devices" would have had in the case, listed some devices: "Examples of
such protective provisions are supermajority voting provisions, majority of the minority
requirements etc." Id. at 42 n.12. The court also referred to standstill provisions. Id.
Although no guidance is provided about how to evaluate such protective devices, it is
clear that boards of directors will have some ability to take such devices into account
in evaluating offers.
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in the back-end value, which was subsequently topped by QVC's $90
per share bid. Notwithstanding the fact that the Paramount board did not
communicate with QVC because of its interpretation of the restrictions
imposed upon it by the no-shop agreement, "the Paramount Board
determined that the new QVC offer was not in the best interests of the
[Paramount] stockholders."92
After holding that enhanced duties were triggered, the Delaware
Supreme Court stated that "when bidders make relatively similar offers,
or dissolution of the company becomes inevitable, the directors cannot
fulfill their enhanced Unocal duties by playing favorites with the
contending factions." 93 When enhanced duties apply, the board of a
selling corporation must "act on an informed basis to secure the best
value reasonably available to the stockholders."94 According to the
court in QVC, the directors of Paramount were "paralyzed by their
uninformed belief that the QVC offer was 'illusory'" and thus failed to
determine whether they had obtained the best value reasonably available
under the circumstances. 95
6.

Arnold

In Arnold v. Society for Savings Bancorp, Jnc., 96 the Delaware
Supreme Court held that, in a stock-for-stock merger that does not result
in a change in control, Revlon duties do not attach. The opinion also
suggests that a corporation may move into the realm of Revlon duties
and then subsequently remove itself from the application of such duties.
In early 1991, the financially troubled Society for Savings Bancorp,
Incorporated announced that it had retained a financial advisor to seek
transactions which would enhance shareholder value. Offers, either for
Society as a whole or in parts, were not readily forthcoming. The offers
that did materialize, including an offer from Society's financial advisor
to purchase part of Society's assets, were heavily conditioned and
doubtful as to their ability to reach consummation. The board of Society
ultimately dismissed its financial advisor and issued a public statement

92. Id. at 41.
93. Id. at 46 (citing Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506
A.2d 173, 184 (Del. 1986)).
94. Id. at 37.
95. Id. at 50.
96. 650 A.2d 1270, 1273 (Del. 1994).
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that it "intended to focus on strengthening itself as an independent
entity."97 Subsequently, the Bank of Boston contacted Society to
discuss the possibility of an acquisition of Society. Under the terms of
a proposed merger that emerged from negotiations, each Society share
would be exchanged for .78 of a Bank of Boston share. In addition, the
proposal included a no-shop provision as well as lock-up rights. The
final version of the merger agreement approved by the board of Society
provided for an exchange of each Society share for .80 of a Bank of
Boston share, based on the trading price of Bank of Boston shares at the
closing (subject to an adjustable $20 per share cap) and modified lock-up
and no-shop provisions. In connection with the no-shop provision that
was granted to the Bank of Boston, Society negotiated a "fiduciary out."
The Delaware Court of Chancery had rejected the plaintiff's claim
that, when Society agreed to merge with the Bank of Boston, Revlon
duties were triggered. 98 Citing Time, the chancery court noted that
Society had neither "put itself on the auction block when it began
negotiation with [the Bank of Boston]" nor abandoned its long-term
strategy in response to a bidder's offer, the two traditional Revlon
triggers. 99 According to the Court of Chancery, while Revlon duties
had certainly been implicated upon the public announcement of the
hiring of a financial advisor to seek bidders for Society, such duties did
not apply to the subsequent merger with the Bank of Boston because, in
the interim, the board of directors of Society had made a deliberate
choice to remain independent and return to its long-term strategy. 100
The plaintiff further argued that, once Society had decided to enter
into the stock-for-stock merger with the Bank of Boston, Revlon duties
attached. The chancery court, however, supported by the Delaware
Supreme Court, found that Revlon duties were never implicated in this
circumstance because there was no change of control of Society. 101
The supreme court noted that a "sale or change of control" was not
implicated in this case because ownership of Society was being retained
by a large, fluid aggregation of public shareholders. 102

97. Id. at 1275.
98. Arnold v. Society for Sav. Bancorp, Inc., 1993 Del. Ch. LEXIS 275 (Del. Ch.
Dec. I 7, 1993), affd in part, rev 'din part, 650 A.2d 1270, 1273 (Del. 1994).
99. Id. at *31 (citing Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d
1140, 1151-52 (Del. 1989)).
100. Id.
IOI. Arnold, 650 A.2d at 1289.
102. Id. at 1289-90 (citing Paramount Communications Inc. v. QVC Network Inc.,
637 A.2d 34, 42-47 (Del. 1993)).
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7.

Santa Fe

In June 1994, Santa Fe Pacific Corporation and Burlington Northern,
Inc. (BNI) agreed to a stock-for-stock merger based on an exchange ratio
of 0.27 BNI shares for each share of Santa Fe (worth about $13.50 per
Santa Fe share). 103 Subsequently, Union Pacific Corporation proposed
a competing stock-for-stock merger with Santa Fe worth about $18 per
Santa Fe share. The Santa Fe board, basing its decision on antitrust
concerns, the inadequacy of the offered price, and the fact that the Santa
Fe/BNI merger agreement did not allow Santa Fe to consider Union
Pacific's bid, rejected the competing offer. After BNI and Union Pacific
both improved their bids, Union Pacific commenced a tender offer for
up to 57.1 % of Santa Fe stock. Santa Fe recommended to its shareholders that they not tender their shares into the Union Pacific tender offer.
After Santa Fe adopted a "poison pill," Santa Fe and BNI amended their
merger agreement to allow for a joint tender offer whereby both
companies would purchase up to 33% of Santa Fe's shares for $20 per
share in cash. The tender offer was conditioned upon Santa Fe's
shareholders approving a "back-end" merger with BNI, the consideration
for which was to be 0.4 BNI share for each Santa Fe share. Union
Pacific then revised its bid and announced an all-shares/all-cash bid of
$18.50 per Santa Fe share. Although Santa Fe's board announced that
its financial advisors considered the latest Union Pacific offer fair, the
board recommended that its shareholders not accept the offer. Santa Fe
and BNI then completed their joint tender offer and the Santa Fe
shareholders approved the merger with BNI in February of 1995. 104
The plaintiff shareholders of Santa Fe claimed that the Santa Fe
directors had breached their Revlon duties by not auctioning the
company. 105 The Court of Chancery, however, rejected the claim,
stating t'1at:
Although "Revlon duties" will attach when a "corporation initiates an active
bidding process seeking to sell itself," Arnold, 650 A.2d at 1290, where the
favored transaction does not involve a change of control, a disinterested,
independent board of directors has the "prerogative ... to resist a third party's

103.
70 (Del.
104.
105.

In re Santa Fe Pac. Corp., Shareholder Litig. No. 13587, 1995 Del. Ch. LEXIS
Ch. May 31, 1995), aff'd in part, rev 'd in part, 669 A.2d 59 (Del. I 995).
Id.
Id. at *15.
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unsolicited acquisition proposal or offer." In those circumstances a board may,
consistent with its fiduciary dutiesl,; prefer a preexisting transaction without
becoming subject to Revlon duties. 1

The Court of Chancery noted that, although an active bidding process
existed for Santa Fe, such process had not been initiated by Santa
Fe. 107 The Court of Chancery also upheld a $50 million termination
fee and $10 million expense reimbursement provision on a more than
$3.5 billion transaction and certain other transaction protection mechanisms against a Unocal challenge. w8 The Supreme Court affirmed the
Court of Chancery's holding with respect to the Revlon claim, noting
that: "While the Board properly encouraged Union Pacific to improve its
offer and may have used the result as leverage against Burlington, the
Plaintiffs do not allege that the Board at any point decided to pursue a
transaction which would result in a sale of control of Santa Fe to
Burlington. Rather, the complaint portrays the Board as firmly
committed to a stock-for-stock merger with Burlington." 109

8.

Mendel

In Mendel v. Carroll, 110 the Delaware Court of Chancery considered
an action in which a plaintiff requested the grant of an option to
purchase shares sufficient to dilute a controlling group of shareholders'
holdings in order to allow minority shareholders to accept the terms of
a merger proposal. The Carroll family controlled between 48% and 52%
of the shares of Katy Industries and through legal agreements had agreed
among themselves to purchase, but not voluntarily sell, their Katy shares.
The Carroll family proposed a transaction to the Katy board to purchase
all non-Carroll Katy shares for $22 per share in cash but advised the
board that they had no interest in selling their Katy shares. At that time,
Katy shares were trading at $24. A special committee of the board
refused the proposal as inadequate, and insisted on $26 per share.
Offering only up to $24, the Carrolls withdrew the offer. Subsequently,
the Carrolls offered a new proposal to the Katy board, this time for
$25.75 per share in cash. Relying on the opinion of their financial
advisor that the offer was within a range of fairness, the special
committee, together with the entire board, approved the Carroll proposal

I 06. Id. at *24 (citations omitted).
107. Id. at *25. The reasons for the Supreme Court's reversal and remand of the
Unocal claim, which were unrelated to the specific lock-ups, are discussed infra in Part
V.A.2.
I 08. Id. at *32 n.8.
109. Santa Fe, 669 A.2d at 71.
110. 651 A.2d 297 (Del. Ch. 1994).
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as in the best interests of the Katy shareholders. Subsequently, a third
party bidder emerged offering $29 per share in cash. The Katy board
then informed the Carrolls that it could no longer endorse their merger
proposal. Although the $29 proposal foundered, another party proposed
to purchase all outstanding Katy shares for $28 (which was later adjusted
down to $27.80) per share in cash. The special committee pursued
negotiations with this latest suitor. The negotiations included a proposed
stock option whereby the acquiror would be granted an irrevocable
option to purchase 1.8 million Katy shares at the merger price along
with the right, if the merger was not consummated, to put the 1.8 million
shares to Katy. Over the vehement objections of the Carroll family, the
special committee continued merger negotiations with the potential
acquiror; the final stumbling block was the stock option. Finally, the
Katy board refused to proceed with the merger proposal because their
Delaware legal counsel was unable to give an opinion as to the legality
of the stock option.
The Katy board then considered the following options to enhance
shareholder value: "(i) a self-tender by Katy; (ii) a Dutch auction for
Katy shares; and/or (iii) a dividend in excess of $10.00 per share on
Katy's common stock." 111 The board subsequently approved a special
cash dividend of $14 per common share. Before the dividend was paid,
however, a suit was brought claiming that the Katy board's acceptance
of the Carrolls' initial merger proposal invoked Revlon duties and that
the board was therefore required to accept the subsequent higher bid and
grant the option in order to break the control of the Carrolls. In refusing
to order the granting of the option, the Delaware Court of Chancery first
noted that Delaware law accepts the legitimacy, "albeit in a guarded
fashion," of a controlling shareholder obtaining a control premium. 112
The court discussed the possibility that the Carroll offer of $25.75 per
share could be fair while the higher offer of $27.80 per share could be
inadequate, based upon the existence of a control premium contained in
the Carrolls' block of shares. m "The significant fact is that in the
Carroll Family Merger, the buyers were not buying corporate control ...

111.
112.
113.

Id. at 303.
Id. at 305.
Id. at 304-05.
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[t]hey already had it." 114 Such was not the case with respect to the
competing bid. According to the court, that:
was an offer, in effect, to the controlling shareholder to purchase corporate
control, and to all public shareholders, to purchase the remaining part of the
company's shares, all at a single price. It distributed the control premium
evenly over all shares. Because the Pensler proposed $27.80 price was a price
that contemplated not simply the purchase of non-controlling stock, as did the
Carroll Family Merger, but complete control over the corporation, it was not
fairly comparable to the per-share price proposed by the Carroll Group. 1"

Thus, the plaintiff's argument that the alternative to the Carroll merger
proposal had to be accepted by the Katy board under the application of
Revlon duties was rejected by the court. However, the court continued:
To note that these proposals are fundamentally different does not, of course,
mean that the board owes fiduciary duties in one instance but not in the other.
That is not the case . . . . In this circumstance ... the board's duty was to
respect the rights of the Carroll Family, while assuring that if any transaction
of the type proposed was to be accomplished, it would be accomplished only
on terms that were fair to the public shareholders and represented the best
available terms from their point of view. 116

The court then compared the duties of the Katy board when confronted
with the Carroll proposal to those of a board upon the triggering of
Revlon duties. "[I]f the board were to have approved a proposed cashout merger, it would have to bear in mind that the transaction is a finalstage transaction for the public shareholders. Thus, the time frame for
analysis ... is immediate value maximization." 117 Accordingly, the
board of directors, if their fiduciary duties will allow, is obligated to
maximize the minority shareholder's value. Given the fact that a
controlling shareholder is not required to sell its interest without some
compelling need to protect the minority shareholder, a board of directors
may not act against the interests of a majority shareholder. 118 Based
on the above analysis, the court determined not only that Revlon did not
require the forced dilution of the Carroll family interest, but that the
fiduciary duties owed by the Katy board to the Carrolls italicize such
action. 119

114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
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9.

Revlon and the Duty of Care

Going back at least to Barkan, there has been an effort by the
Delaware Supreme Court to explain Revlon duties as an incarnation of
the fundamental duties of care and loyalty for specified factual
circumstances. 120 More recently, Technicolor and Q VC have focused
on Revlon as an instance of the duty of care----or, more specifically, the
duty of the board to inform itself of all material information reasonably
available. The Technicolor opinion points out that the Chancery Court
had "noted the relevance of Revlon in 'illuminat[ing] the scope of [the]
board's due care obligations .. .' and implied that the Technicolor
board's failure to auction the company evidenced a breach of their duty
of care." 121 The supreme court also included the following in a
footnote in its opinion:
The Chancellor wrote: " ... the due care theory and the Revlon theory do not
present two separate legal theories justifying shareholder recovery . . . . [B]oth
theories reduce to a claim that directors were inadequately informed ( of
alternatives, or of the consequences of executing a merger and related
agreements). An auction is a way to get information. A pre- or post-agreement
market-check mechanism is another, less effective but perhaps less risky, way
to get information. A 'lock-up' is suspect because it impedes the emergence
of information in that an alternative buyer that would pay (or would have paid)
more is less likely to emerge once such an impediment is in place." 122

In any situation in which Revlon duties are applicable and the board
chooses not to conduct an auction, it is important to keep accurate
records of the alternatives considered by the board, the information
provided to the board regarding those alternatives, and the board's
consideration of the pros and cons of various means of determining
whether a particular transaction is the best one available. In effect, the
board must be able to show that it made informed decisions about how
to become informed. Accordingly, a record of work done by the board's
120. See Barkan v. Amsted Indus. Inc., 567 A.2d 1279, 1286 (Del. 1989) ("[T]he
basic teaching of [Revlon and Unocal] is simply that directors must act in accordance
with their fundamental duties of care and loyalty.").
121. Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 369 (Del. I 993), modified on
reargument, 636 A.2d 956 (Del. 1994) (quoting Cinerama, Inc. v. Technicolor, Inc.,
I 99 I WL 111134 at *40 (Del. Ch. June 24, 1991 ), aff'd in part, rev 'd in part, 634 A.2d
345 (Del. 1993)).
122. Id. at 369 n.37 (quoting 1991 WL 111134 at *39-40); see infra Part V for a
discussion of lock-ups and other transaction protection mechanisms.
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advisors and by management, as reviewed by the board, is not enough
unless the court also perceives that the board (and especially the
independent directors) has taken "an active and direct role in the context
of a sale of a company from beginning to end." 123 This does not mean
that the board may not delegate negotiation and implementation of a
transaction to management. However, the board must be prepared to
defend its decisions based on the quality of the information it received
and the thoroughness of its consideration of that information. Thus, it
is important that the directors actively request any additional information
they believe would be relevant. In addition, directors should probe the
conclusions presented by their advisors and management and the
assumptions on which such conclusions are based. The QVC court
found it significant that certain questions it considered obviously
important were not asked by the Paramount directors------e.g., whether
QVC would be able to obtain financing (a condition to the offer that
affected the application of the "no-shop" provision of the ParamountNiacom agreement). The court described what the Paramount
board should have done:
Since the Paramount directors had already decided to sell control, they had an
obligation to continue their search for the best value reasonably available to the
stockholders. This continuing obligation included the responsibility, at the
October 24 board meeting and thereafter, to evaluate critically both the QVC
tender offers and the Paramount/Viacom transaction to determine if: (a) the
QVC tender offer was, or would continue to be, conditional; (b) the QVC
tender offer could be improved; (c) the Viacom tender offer or other aspects of
the Paramount/Viacom transaction could be improved; (d) each of the respective
offers would be reasonably likely to come to closure, and under what
circumstances; (e) other material information was reasonably available for
consideration by Paramount directors; (t) there were viable and realistic
alternative courses of action; and (g) the timing constraints could be managed
so the directors could consider these matters carefully and deliberately. 124

In contrast, the Time court was favorably impressed by how "Time's
outside directors met frequently without management, officers or
directors being present. At the request of the outside directors, corporate
counsel was present during the board meetings and, from time to time,
the management directors were asked to leave the board sessions." 125
The above-described cases are evidence that courts are willing to
immerse themselves in the deliberative process to determine what the
directors didn't know, and why they didn't know it. The courts have

123. Id. at 368.
124. Paramount Communications Inc., v. QVC Network Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 48-49
(Del. 1993).
125. Paramount Communications Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1147-48 (Del.
1989).
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before them the record of the proceedings, the results of discovery,
deposition and witness testimony, and resulting events. In other words,
they have the answers, and they are often tempted to pose the questions
which they believe a reasonable, prudent director should have asked.
Directors, therefore, should make an effort to manage the deliberative
process in a way that will ensure that they receive sufficient information
and have sufficient time to reach a reasoned judgment. However, as the
Delaware Supreme Court stated in Barkan:
[T]here is no single blueprint that a board must follow to fulfill its duties. A
stereotypical approach to the sale and acquisition of corporate control is not to
be expected in the face of the evolving techniques and financing devices
employed in today's corporate environment. Rather, a board's actions must be
evaluated in light of relevant circumstances to determine if they were
undertaken with due diligence and in good faith. If no breach of duty is found,
the board's actions are entitled to the protections of the business judgment
rule. 126

10.

Market Checks

A market check provides a means of meeting the obligation of the
seller's board to inform itself with respect to the value of the company
without entering into a formal auction process. 127 Even where Revlon
would not be applicable, a market check can assist the board in meeting
its duty of care in approving a transaction.
A pre-deal market check can be performed by a company's financial
advisor by contacting companies that would be likely candidates to
acquire the company before entering into negotiations with any one
party. A pre-deal market check does, however, create risks. Rumors
that the company will be for sale may begin to circulate, which may
result in pressure to engage in a full-scale auction, regardless of whether
the board believes that to be the best means of selling the company. On
the other hand, a pre-deal market check allows a selling company to
obtain information that could be very useful in subsequent negotiations
with a particular purchaser.
The second type of market check, a post-deal market check, allows the
selling company to complete the negotiations for the sale or merger of
126. Barkan, 567 A.2d at 1286 (citations omitted).
127. See, e.g., id. at 1286 (when only one party has made an offer and the Board
has "no reliable grounds upon which to judge its adequacy, [Revlon] demands a canvas
of the market to determine if higher bids may be elicited").
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the company and then have the latitude to seek higher bids. The initial
bidder will most likely demand substantial termination fees and other
protective mechanisms before agreeing to permit its bid to be shopped
in this way. 128 If no higher offer results after a reasonable period of
contacting prospective purchasers, the board will have established a
strong basis for defeating any argument that it did not meet its fiduciary
duties in approving the transaction. Even in the absence of efforts to
contact alternate bidders, a significant period in which bidders are able
to top an existing offer without triggering burdensome protection
mechanisms will also allow the board to support its decision to approve
a transaction.
V.

TRANSACTION PROTECTION MECHANISMS AND
RELATED MATTERS

A.
1.

General Issues

.(/Revlon Duties Apply

Acquirors (or both parties, in a merger of equals) often demand that
the terms of the transaction include specified economic benefits to such
party in the event a third party disrupts the transaction. In part, this
reflects a desire to be compensated for the costs involved in pursuing a
transaction and, in certain circumstances, for the benefits that could have
been achieved from potential alternative opportunities that were forgone.
In addition, these provisions function to remove the incentive to use the
acquiror as a stalking horse for a superior transaction. The terms may
include cash payments (break-up or termination fees or expense
reimbursement), lock-up stock options (which permit the optionholder
to participate with the other stockholders in a third party transaction),
and options to purchase specified assets of the seller. In addition, an
acquiror may demand that the transaction agreement be drafted in a
manner that makes it difficult for the seller to have contacts with a third
party regarding a potential offer (a "no-shop" provision) or for the seller
to terminate the agreement to pursue another offer (such right, if it is
included, is referred to as a "fiduciary out" or "fiduciary termination
right").
Break-up fees and lock-up stock options make it more expensive for
a third party to compete with the original acquiror. The third party not
only must pay the stockholders for their shares, but also must bear the

128.
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cost of the transaction protection devices. This may skew the playing
field in favor of the original acquiror and has made such devices
controversial in cases where Revlon duties apply, especially when it
appears from the magnitude of the total payments that the deterrent
effect was the primary motivation for such devices and that the seller
embraced such devices for their deterrent effect. If the original bidder's
offer is inferior to the third party offer and the total compensation to be
received by the original bidder in the event of interference is large, a
court is likely to determine that the playing field has been impermissibly
skewed in violation of the Revlon duties of the seller's board. The
Revlon court described the appropriate considerations as follows:
Such [devices] can entice other bidders to enter a contest for control of the
corporation, creating an auction for the company and maximizing shareholder
profit. Current economic conditions in the takeover market are such that a
"white knight" ... might only enter the bidding for the target company if it
receives some form of compensation to cover the risks and costs involved ....
However, while those [devices] which draw bidders into the battle benefit
shareholders, similar measures which end an active auction and foreclose further
bidding operate to the shareholders' detriment. 129

At an appropriate point in an auction, however, even measures which
end the auction may be appropriate if a substantial benefit is conferred
on stockholders, after attempts have been made to negotiate with other
bidders. 130
QVC contains an extended analysis of the transaction protection
mechanisms demanded by Viacom and agreed to by Paramount. 131
QVC makes clear that a board may not, if it enters into a business
combination agreement that triggers Revlon duties (e.g., for an all-cash
transaction or a stock-for-stock transaction that would result in a change
of control), contract away its obligation to meet its fiduciary duties with

129. Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 183 (Del.
1986).
130. See Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1284 (Del.
1988).
131. Paramount Communications Inc. v. QVC Network Inc., 637 A.2d 34 (Del.
1993). The analyses by the Court of Chancery and the Supreme Court of the lock-ups
in QVC were criticized in Fraidin & Hanson, Toward Unlocking Lockups, 103 YALE L.J.
1739, 1757-64 (I 994), an article applying economic theory to argue that courts should
enforce virtually all lock-ups.
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respect to competing offers from other parties. 132
Supreme Court stated:

The Delaware

The Paramount defendants contend that they were precluded by certain
contractual provisions, including the No-Shop Provision, from negotiating with
QVC or seeking alternatives. Such provisions, whether or not they are
presumptively valid in the abstract, may not validly define or limit the directors'
fiduciary duties under Delaware law or prevent the Paramount directors from
carrying out their fiduciary duties under Delaware law. To the extent such
provisions are inconsistent with those duties, they are invalid and unenforceable. m

In connection with the September 1994 merger agreement with
Viacom described in Part IV.B.5, the Paramount board had approved the
following transaction protection measures: (i) a "no-shop" provision
which restricted Paramount from soliciting or negotiating a competing
bid unless a third party made a bona fide bid without any material
financing contingencies and the Paramount board determined such
negotiations were necessary to comply with its fiduciary duties to
shareholders; (ii) a "break-up fee" of $100 million payable upon either
Paramount terminating the proposed merger agreement as a result of a
competing transaction, Paramount shareholders not approving the
transaction, or the Paramount board recommending a competing
transaction; and (iii) a stock option agreement whereby Viacom would
have the option to purchase approximately 19.9% of Paramount's
common stock at $69.14 if the break-up fee was triggered for any
reason. 134 Further, in addition to there being no "cap" on the stock
option's value, under the terms of the proposed stock option, Viacom
would have been permitted to finance the exercise of the option with a
senior subordinated note, worth approximately $1.6 billion (the "Note
Feature"), and to require Paramount to pay Viacom an amount in cash
equal to the spread between the market price of the common stock
subject to the option and the exercise price of the option (the "Put
Feature"). 135 Applying enhanced scrutiny, the QVC court concluded
that, with respect to such measures, "the Paramount directors process
was not reasonable, and the result achieved for the stockholders was not
reasonable under the circumstances." 136 The supreme court further
stated:
When entering into the Original Merger Agreement, and thereafter, the
Paramount Board clearly gave insufficient attention to the potential consequenc-

132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
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es of the defensive measures demanded by Viacom. The Stock Option
Agreement had a number of unusual and potentially "draconian" provisions,
including the Note Feature and the Put Feature. Furthermore, the Termination
Fee, whether or not unreasonable by itself, clearly made Paramount less
attractive to other bidders, when coupled with the Stock Option Agreement.
Finally, the No-Shop Provision inhibited the Paramount Board's ability to
negotiate with other potential bidders, particularly QVC which had already
expressed an interest in Paramount. 137

In footnotes, the supreme court noted that it was not expressing any
opinion (a) as to "whether a stock option agreement of essentially this
magnitude, but with a reasonable 'cap' and without the Note and Put
Features, would be valid or invalid under other circumstances" 138 or
(b) as to "whether certain aspects of the No-Shop Provision here could
be valid in another context." 139 However, the supreme court proceeded
to point out, "[w]here a board has no reasonable basis upon which to
judge the adequacy of a contemplated transaction, a no-shop restriction
gives rise to the inference that the board seeks to forestall competing
bids." 140 Thus, when Revlon duties apply, transaction protection
mechanisms are likely to be invalidated, unless the mechanisms in
question can be shown to further the board's sole duty of getting the
"highest value reasonably attainable" for the shareholders. 141 Although
the QVC court invalidated certain of the transaction protection mechanisms agreed to by Paramount and Viacom, the holding of the court is
limited to situations where Revlon duties have been triggered. 142 In
addition, the QVC court did not say that such mechanisms are inherently
problematic; rather, the court was critical of certain features of the
Paramount/Viacom transaction protection mechanisms and of the size of
the monetary benefits that would have accrued to Viacom. 143
The QVC court was especially troubled by the fact that the Paramount
board did not seek to renegotiate the transaction protection mechanisms
when it might have been possible to do so in connection with the

137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
(quoting
142.
143.

(footnotes omitted).
at 49 n.19 (citations omitted).
at 49 n.20.
(quoting Barkan v. Amsted Indus. Inc., 567 A.2d 1279, 1288 (Del. 1989)).
See Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1288 (Del. 1988)
Revlon, 506 A.2d at I 82).
QVC, 637 A.2d 34.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

Id.
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renegotiation of other terms of the ParamountNiacom agreement. The
supreme court stated that:
Under the circumstances [existing at October 23-24], it should have been clear
to the Paramount Board that the Stock Option Agreement, coupled with the
Termination Fee and the No-Shop Clause, were impeding the realization of the
best value reasonably available to the Paramount stockholders. Nevertheless,
the Paramount Board made no effort to eliminate or modify these counterproductive devices, and instead continued to cling to its vision of a strategic
alliance with Viacom. 144

In addition, in discussing a later point when the QVC offer exceeded the
Viacom offer by $1 billion, the supreme court rebuked the directors as
follows:
When the Paramount directors met on November 15 to consider QVC's
increased tender offer, they remained prisoners of their own misconceptions and
missed opportunities to eliminate the restrictions they had imposed on
themselves. Yet, it was not "too late" to reconsider negotiating with QVC.
The circumstances existing on November 15 made it clear that the defensive
measures, taken as a whole, were problematic: (a) the No-Shop Provision could
not define or limit their fiduciary duties; (b) the Stock Option Agreement had
become "draconian"; and (c) the Termination Fee, in context with all the
circumstances, was similarly deterring the realization of higher bids.
Nevertheless, the Paramount directors remained paralyzed by their uninformed
belief that the QVC offer was "illusory." This final opportunity to negotiate on
the stockholders' behalf and to fulfill their obligation to seek the best value
reasonably available was thereby squandered. 145

By their nature, breach of fiduciary duty claims brought against boards
(whether by hostile bidders or by shareholders) are litigated in expedited
proceedings on essentially paper records. QVC highlights the importance
of a board's deliberative process and the need for keen sensitivity to the
living record created in considering a friendly business combination
transaction or responding to an unsolicited one. When the record of the
board's processes creates a favorable impression with the courts, as was
the case in the Time litigation, the likelihood of the board's decision
receiving deference is greatly increased.

2.

.if Revlon Duties Do Not Apply

Even if Revlon duties do not apply, the board's decision to agree to
transaction protection mechanisms after emergence of a rival bid will
clearly be subject to enhanced scrutiny under Unocal and Unitrin. 146

144. Id. at 50.
145. Id.
146. In re Santa Fe Pac. Corp., Shareholder Litig. No. 13587, 1995 Del. Ch. LEXIS
70, at *24 (Del. Ch. May 31, 1995), ajf'd in part, rev'd in part, 669 A.2d 59 (Del. 1995)
("[O]nce the board determined to alter the Santa Fe-BNI transaction in response to the

1114

[VOL. 33: 1077, 1996]

Negotiating Business
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

Applying Unocal and Unitrin, if the mechanisms employed in the
transaction are found not to preclude third party offers and not to have
a coercive effect on stockholders, such mechanisms should be permissible if "within a range of reasonableness." 147 In Santa Fe, the transaction protection mechanisms that the plaintiffs claimed to be a breach of
the Santa Fe directors' fiduciary duties included the adoption and
application of a "poison pill" stockholder rights plan by Santa Fe and the
$50 million termination fee and a $10 million expense reimbursement
provision in favor of BNI contained in the Santa Fe!BNI merger
Agreement. 148 The Court of Chancery found that the transaction
protection mechanisms, particularly the discriminatory use of the poison
pill, were reasonable, proportionate responses to the threat posed by
Union Pacific's offer because the mechanisms "preserved the preferred
BNI merger transaction, but only after first causing Union Pacific to
offer the highest value that it was willing to pay, and after causing BNI
to offer value that was either comparable or higher." 149 The Court of
Chancery specifically noted that "[g]iven the magnitude of the transaction in question (over $3.5 billion), nothing alleged in the complaint
gives rise to a claim that the $50 million termination fee and $10 million
dollar expense reimbursement provision were not reasonable." 150

unwanted Union Pacific bid, the altered transaction, which included the joint tender offer
and the repurchase program, became subject to enhanced scrutiny under Unocal. ... ");
Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1151-55 (Del. 1989) (noshop clause adopted at the insistence of Warner and share exchange were properly
subject to Unocal analysis).
147. See Unitrin, Inc. v. American General Corp., 651 A.2d 1361 (Del. 1995);
Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985). See supra Part IV.A.I,
for a discussion of Unocal and supra Part IV.A.3, for a discussion of Unitrin.
148. Santa Fe, 1995 Del. Ch. LEXIS at *27. See supra Part IV.B.7, for a
description of the facts in Santa Fe and holdings of the Court of Chancery and the
Supreme Court with respect to the Revlon claim in the case.
149. Id. at *33.
150. Santa Fe, 1995 Del. Ch. LEXIS 70, at *32 n.8. The Supreme Court, after
holding that the Court of Chancery should not, for purposes of a motion to dismiss, have
relied on statements contained in the proxy materials distributed to the shareholders of
Burlington and Santa Fe, concluded that the Court of Chancery had erred in dismissing
the Unocal claim. Id. at 72. In doing so, the Supreme Court noted that: "This case
may very well illustrate the difficulty of expeditiously dispensing with claims seeking
enhanced judicial scrutiny at the pleading stage where the complaint is not completely
conclusory . . . . Here, there are well pleaded allegations on the Unocal claim. As the
terminology of enhanced scrutiny implies, boards can expect to be required to justify
their decisionrnaking, within a range of reasonableness, when they adopt defensive
measures with implicatins for corporate control. This scrutiny will usually not be
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The above-cited cases do not, however, make clear whether Unocal
scrutiny would be applicable to transaction protection mechanisms
agreed to prior to the emergence of a particular third party bid or
whether the business judgment rule would apply. If the mechanisms
result from arm's length bargaining, as would clearly be the case in a
merger of equals providing parallel protections for each party, it is
difficult to see why the approval of such mechanisms should be secondguessed by the courts, absent a failure to act with due care. Whether or
not transaction protection mechanisms are subject to enhanced scrutiny,
the requirement of seeking shareholder approval provides a limit on the
deterrent effect of such mechanisms, especially non-economic provisions
such as a no-shop or the lack of a fiduciary termination right. 151

B.

Particular Transaction Protection Mechanisms

This part of the Article describes particular transaction protection
mechanisms and certain variations in their features.
Except as specifically noted, the discussion in this part assumes that
Revlon duties apply to the transaction in question. With respect to each
mechanism, we have attempted to summarize any specific limits placed
by courts on its use. In general, however, such limits remain vague and
are subject to case-by-case review. In addition, as in QVC, one can
expect the Delaware courts to look at the total package of transaction
protection mechanisms in determining whether a violation of the board's
fiduciary duties has occurred. Under QVC, acceptance of such
mechanisms by the seller must be consistent with the board's sole duty
of getting the "highest value reasonably attainable" for the shareholders
by, for example, bringing in a bidder who would not otherwise make an
satisfied by resting on a defense motion merely attacking the pleadings." Id. See also
Wells Fargo Co. v. First Interstate Bancorp, 1996 Del. Ch. LEXIS 3, *18-*20 (Del Ch.
Jan. 18, I 996).
151. Note, however, that shareholder approval of a merger will not be deemed to
provide ratification on the transaction protection mechanisms employed in connection
with the merger. See Santa Fe, 669 A.2d at 67-68, where the Supreme Court refused
to find ratification because:
In voting to approve the Santa Fe-Burlington merger, the Santa Fe
Stockholders were not asked to ratify the Board's unilateral decision to erect
defensive measures against the Union Pacific offer. The stockholders were
merely offered a choice between the Burlington Merger and doing nothing.
The Santa Fe stockholders did not vote in favor of the precise [transaction
protection] measures under challenge in the complaint. ...
If, however, a transaction protection mechanism was specifically approved by
stockholders, it would not constitute "unilateral" action by the directors and Unocal
would be inapplicable. See Williams v. Geier, 671 A.2d 1368, 1377 (Del. 1996) ("A
Unocal analysis should be used only when a board unilaterally (i.e., without stockholder
approval) adopts defensive measures in reaction to a perceived threat").
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offer or by causing a bidder to agree to more favorable terms with
respect to some other aspect of the transaction. 152 In order to create
a record of the benefit achieved in return for agreeing to transaction
protection mechanisms, the seller will want to attempt to minimize the
aggregate potential cost of such mechanisms. In addition, after QVC it
is probably unwise, if Revlon duties are applicable, to leave uncapped
the total amount of the monetary benefits that the acquiror may receive.
The seller's board should be carefully briefed with respect to the
negotiations with the acquiror regarding such provisions to allow the
board to make a reasoned judgment in approving any such provisions.
Counsel for seller should remind the board that, when Revlon duties
apply, it is not a proper purpose for the seller to attempt to protect the
transaction from credible third party offers that would be more favorable
to the seller's stockholders, except to the extent the acquiror's bargaining
power forces the seller to do so in order to get a "bird in the hand." On
the other hand, there may be situations where the seller's bargaining
power will allow the seller to retain its rights to shop the deal, 153
especially if the seller is willing to agree to appropriate compensation for
the purchaser if a third party deal is chosen.

1.

Break-Up or Termination Fees and Expense Reimbursement

Break-up or termination fees vary in two important respects: (a) their
size and (b) the events that trigger payment. Reimbursement of either
actual out-of-pocket expenses or a sum certain that approximates such
expenses is not likely to raise significant issues with the courts.
Generally speaking, a break-up fee of approximately l %-3% of the
aggregate transaction value (with the lower range of percentages in large
transactions and the higher range in small transactions) is likely to be
deemed reasonable if it results from arm's length bargaining and is not
supplemented by a lock-up option. In transactions that do not implicate
Revlon duties, larger amounts should be permitted as a means of
defending the transaction from interference if they fall within a range of
reasonableness for that purpose. The seller should seek to locate the
trigger for payment of a fee on or after board approval of the competing

152.
1993).
153.

Paramount Communications Inc. v. QVC Network Inc., 637 A.2d 34 (Del.

See supra Part IV.B. 10 for a discussion of post-signing market checks.
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transaction and execution of a definitive agreement, a point when the
benefits of the second bid to the stockholders will be concrete.
Typically, the purchaser will request that such fees be payable on
termination of the agreement to which it is a party.
2.

Lock-Up Stock Options

The seller may grant the purchaser an option to purchase an agreed
upon number of shares of common stock at an agreed upon price in the
event a third party interferes with the transaction. Options to purchase
shares representing up to 19.9% of the seller's outstanding common
stock were common prior to QVC and remain common in bank mergers.
In light of the focus in QVC on the total consideration to be received by
the purchaser in the event of a third party transaction and the vehemence
of the court's objection to the lock-up option, recent transactions tend to
rely on break-up fees and expense reimbursement provisions. 154
However, there is no reason that an option could not be substituted for
a break-up fee if the maximum gain on the option is capped at a
reasonable amount sufficient to assure the purchaser that it is not merely
a "stalking horse." In transactions that do not implicate Revlon duties,
greater gain on the options should be permitted as a means of defending
the transaction from interference, if within a range of reasonableness for
that purpose. Arguably, even uncapped options may pass muster under
the Unocal proportionality analysis that could be applied. 155 In a
merger of equals, the quid pro quo of mutual stock options would seem
to be especially likely to be deemed within a range of reasonableness.
Typically, the options are exercisable at the deal price. The terms that
vary among such options include the triggers for exercisability of the
option. The deterrent effect, from the purchaser's point of view, will be
increased if the option can be exercised at any time after termination of
the transaction agreement to which it is a party. However, the seller
should seek to locate the trigger closer to consummation of the
competing transaction, at a point when the benefit to the stockholders of
the second bid will be more concrete and consummation is more certain.
Another typical trigger is failure to receive stockholder approval after
being put up for a vote.
With respect to a third party with a perceived need to employ "pooling
of interests" accounting, the existence of a stock option lock-up
arrangement may also carry significant deterrent value. The exercise of

154.
155.
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the option may prevent such third party from using pooling of interests
accounting.

3.

Voting Lock-Ups with Stockholders

If a significant portion of the voting securities of the seller are
concentrated in the hands of a small number of holders, the purchaser
may demand, as a condition to entering into an acquisition agreement,
that such persons enter into agreements with the purchaser that "lock up"
the support of such persons for the transaction. The deterrent effect of
such arrangements on third party bids will, of course, depend on the
number of shares locked up and the vote required to approve the
agreement. Unlike the other mechanisms described in this part, the
seller is not a party to the voting lock-ups. Nonetheless, even if the
decision of the individual stockholders to enter into such agreements is
not directly reviewed by a court, the existence of the voting lock-ups
will be taken into consideration in the court's review of the transaction
protection mechanisms as a whole and their effect on third party bids.
In particular, in evaluating the granting of a stock option lock-up, the
courts will consider the number of shares subject to voting lock-ups in
determining whether the stock option lock-up will foreclose further
bidding. Furthermore, the involvement of the board and management of
the seller in becoming parties to or procuring such agreements may be
interpreted by a court as expressing their support for "locking up" the
deal. As with other transaction protection mechanisms, if it is clear that
voting lock-ups are being procured at the purchaser-'s request, and that
the parties to such arrangements entered into them of their own accord
without pressure from the seller's board, they should not reflect
negatively on whether the board has fulfilled its fiduciary duties.

4.

No-Shop and Window Shop Provisions

A "no-shop" provision is a promise not to solicit, encourage, provide
information to, or otherwise deal with any third parties. The provision
may or may not be subject to a contractual "fiduciary out" that would
create automatic exceptions so long as the board determines, in good
faith after consultation with counsel, that its fiduciary duties require
otherwise. A "window shop" provision is a promise not to solicit other
offers, but it permits a board to provide information to a third party and
otherwise deal with the third party under specified circumstances. Under
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QVC, a fiduciary out to a no-shop or window shop exists, when Revlon
duties apply, as a matter of law. 156 However, by including a contractual fiduciary out, the seller's board can avoid the implication that it
intends to breach its fiduciary duties and is impermissibly favoring one
bidder. In addition, a contractual provision allows the parties to
determine the mechanics and timing of the necessary board decisions and
other procedural matters as to which Delaware law is silent. Some
acquisition agreements also contain a specific right to terminate the
agreement if required by the fiduciary duties of the seller's board. Use
of fiduciary outs and fiduciary termination rights by the seller's board
are often conditioned upon the third party offer meeting certain criteria
as to financing or as to the amount by which the third party offer
exceeds the original offer. 157
As with other transaction protection mechanisms, no-shop provisions
are not per se invalid, but must be justified as assisting the board in its
"obligation to seek the best value reasonably available" for the
stockholders. 158 For example, in litigation challenging the 1986
merger of Western Air Lines, Inc. and Delta Airlines, Inc., the former
shareholders of Western claimed that the Western directors had breached
their duty of care by, among other things, agreeing to a no-shop
provision instead of taking steps to encourage competitive bidding. 159
The court, after quoting the above language from QVC, noted that the
Western board had agreed to the no-shop provision in order to achieve
greater certainty of closing (weakening of the material adverse change

156. QVC, 637 A.2d at 48; see discussion supra Part V.A. l.
157. Query whether a no-shop, with no fiduciary out, but that automatically
disappears on the occurrence of a shareholder vote with respect to a transaction, could,
if demanded by the purchaser, be found to be consistent with the fiduciary duties of the
seller's board under Revlon (assuming all other transaction protection devices are
reasonable under the circumstances)? What if all the other devices also terminate with
the vote? In that case, a limited period of great protection and a subsequent period of
no protection would result. In order to get an agreement with one party, the board
would be giving up, but only for a time, possible transactions with other parties. The
auction, if one is to occur, is postponed but not foreclosed. Some indirect support for
this idea is found in the Unitrin court's testing of the reasonableness of defensive
measures against the ability of a bidder to conduct a proxy fight. See Part IV.A.3 above.
If no other bidders seek to derail the vote in favor of the merger, would that be evidence
that the directors have met their fiduciary duties? Is the result changed if the no-shop
allows giving specified confidential information to other bidders that meet specified
criteria (but not to solicit, encourage or negotiate with such bidders prior to the
shareholder's meeting)? If applied only to other transaction protection mechanisms, but
not to the no-shop, would a similar time limit allow increased protection until the
shareholder vote?
158. QVC, 637 A.2d at 46.
159. Rand v. Western Air Lines, Inc., 1994 Del. Ch. LEXIS 26, at *11-* 12 (Del.
Ch. Jan. 6, 1995), aff"d without op., 659 A.2d 228 (Del. 1995).
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clause in the merger agreement). 160 The court noted that the market
had already been canvassed and that Delta was the only viable remaining
prospect and concluded that "Western gained a substantial benefit for its
stockholders by keeping the only party expressing any interest at the
table while achieving its own assurances that the transaction would be
consummated." 161 In contrast, the Delaware Supreme Court found the
no-shop provision contained in the original Viacom/Paramount merger
agreement unreasonable because it prevented the Paramount board from
learning the details of competing bids and therefore inhibited their ability
to negotiate with other bidders at a time when interest was being
expressed. 162
Even in transactions in which Revlon duties do not apply, the seller (or
the parties in a merger of equals) should negotiate for a fiduciary out to
any no-shop provision. There are two reasons for this: (1) the facts or
structure of the transaction may change and Revlon may apply at a later
time; and (2) the board may wish to avoid creating the perception that
it will not, under any circumstance, listen to any offers (even if only for
the information as to the value of the company an offer provides). In
addition, if the board determines to take defensive action against a third
party offer, in order to assist it in meeting the first prong of Unocal, the
board will want to have adequate information as to the threat posed. 163
The purchaser is often willing to permit the fiduciary out when Revlon
does not apply. In such cases, the fiduciary out should provide a much
more narrow exception to the no-shop because the fiduciary duties of the
board would not require opening up the field to other offers. On the
other hand, the purchaser may not be willing to include a fiduciary
termination right in an acquisition agreement when Revlon does not
apply, believing that this sends the wrong message to possible third
parties when Delaware law would not require the board to terminate its
agreement to accept a higher offer.

160.
161.
162.
163.

Id. at *19.
Id. at *19-*20.
QVC, 637 A.2d at 49.
Unocal, 493 A.2d at 954-55.
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5.

Asset Lock-Up Options

A seller may agree to sell certain of its most valuable assets to an
acquiror in the event a third party bidder seeks to interfere with a
negotiated transaction or as a condition to bringing an acquiror into an
auction. Such agreements, however, have not been popular since the
mid-1980s due to the difficulty in defending such actions against claims
that the directors have violated their fiduciary duties under Revlon. 164
In contrast to the somewhat more measured protective devices discussed
above, an asset lock-up tends to foreclose other bids completely.
Accordingly, if Revlon duties apply the use of an asset lock-up must
confer a substantial benefit upon the shareholders to withstand scrutiny.
In addition, if the option to purchase such assets provides a bargain
price, the seller's board may be subject to charges of corporate waste in
addition to claims that it breached its fiduciary duties. However,
notwithstanding the holdings of the cases cited above (which involved
Revlon duties and clear bias in favor of one bidder), if Revlon does not
apply, it is possible to envision circumstances where, in furtherance of
a strategic combination, an asset lock-up at fair value resulting from
arm's length bargaining would be upheld as not being in violation of the
board's fiduciary duties if adopted in good faith after due care.
Furthermore, such a lock-up might be able to pass a Unocal proportionality test, if applicable.
6.

Commercial Transactions

The parties to a merger may decide to enter into commercial
arrangements, such as sales or distribution contracts or joint venture
agreements, simultaneously with the execution of a merger agreement.
Such arrangements are designed to integrate the operations of the two
entities in order to begin immediately to achieve the synergies associated
with the merger transaction. To the extent the arrangements survive the
termination of the merger agreement, they will serve the purpose of
deterring an unwanted third party bidder who would not want to be
saddled with long-term agreements with a competitor. Before approving
such a transaction, the board should determine whether the arrangements
are defensible as commercially reasonable in their own right. As with
other potentially preclusive mechanisms, if Revlon duties apply, the size,

164. See, e.g., Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173
(Del. 1986); Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261 (Del. 1988);
Hanson Trust PLC v. ML SCM Acquisition Inc., 781 F.2d 264 (2d Cir. 1986).
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nature, or importance of the commercial arrangements will determine the
deterrent effect, which in turn will determine the level of benefit to
stockholders required. If Revlon does not apply, and the commercial
arrangements were negotiated at arm's length in furtherance of a
strategic combination, then the arrangements would be upheld if the
court finds that they were adopted in good faith after due care and, if
applicable, that they were able to pass a Unocal proportionality test.
VI.

SELECTED PROVISIONS OF THE MERGER AGREEMENT

The seller will be most concerned about provisions of the merger
agreement that could allow the purchaser not to close the transaction
based on events or circumstances that are not within the seller's control.
The purchaser, on the other hand, will want to make sure that the
business it acquires is the one it expected. The provisions discussed
below are among the most heavily negotiated in any merger agreement.

A.

Material Adverse Change Clauses and Related Matters

Given the fact that parties to a business combination transaction sign
a merger agreement several months (or longer) prior to the closing of the
transaction, there is a risk that during such period the seller will lose
some of its value. A purchaser will seek to condition its obligation to
consummate the transaction on the absence of a material adverse change
(MAC) in the seller. MAC clauses are often the subject of intense
negotiation between the seller and the purchaser. Ideally, the seller
would like to force the purchaser to accept all risk of such a change.
Certain merger agreements between parties in the same industry, where
the purchaser already faces the same business risks as the seller, contain
no MAC condition or a very limited MAC condition. More typically,
the parties negotiate a MAC clause that leaves some of the risk with the
seller. The purchaser would, ideally, prefer to be able to avoid closing
if, between the signing and the closing of the merger agreement, there
1s:
any circumstance, change in, or effect on, the Seller or any subsidiary of the
Seller that, individually or in the aggregate with all other circumstances,
changes in, or effects on, the Seller or its subsidiaries: (a) is, or could be,
materially adverse to the business, operations, assets or liabilities, results of
operations or the condition (financial or otherwise) of the Seller and its
subsidiaries taken as a whole or (b) could materially adversely affect the ability
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of the Purchaser to operate or conduct the business of the Seller in the manner
in which it is currently operated or conducted by the Seller.

The seller, on the other hand, will seek to limit the MAC clause in
several ways. First, the seller will want to remov~ the word "could" in
clause (b) and any reference to prospects, in order to avoid any
possibility that the purchaser can get out of the agreement based on its
subjective view of future events. In addition, the seller may wish to
remove clause (b) entirely because without the "could" it is merely a
restatement of what is covered in clause (a). In addition, the type of
effects covered by clause (b) could include events or circumstances
relating solely to the purchaser, which should be explicitly excluded.
Other possible exclusions to ask for are: (1) an exclusion for changes
that affect the seller's industry as a whole (especially if the purchaser is
in the same industry), or the economy as a whole; and (2) an exclusion
for changes resulting from the announcement or consummation of the
transaction. The latter can be especially important in vertical mergers
because the customers of the acquired company may be competitors of
the acquiror.
A "back-door" MAC condition may be accomplished through the use
of a "bring-down" condition (that the representations are true as if made
on the closing date). In the case of an agreement with broad representations, this would have an effect similar to that of including a MAC
condition.
B.

Due Diligence Issues

The seller (especially if it is a public company) should resist
provisions that permit the acquiror to forgo closing based on the results
of any due diligence or similar investigation after the signing of the
acquisition agreement. In general, the effect of such a provision (unless
the threshold of problems that would allow the buyer not to close is very
high) would be to grant the buyer an option to purchase the company.
The failure of the transaction to close after a definitive agreement has
been entered into may brand the company as "damaged goods," which,
at the least, would give significant leverage to the acquiror in any preclosing negotiations.
The seller should also resist any attempt by the acquiror to include a
so-called "lOb-5 representation" in the acquisition agreement. The name
"l0b-5 representation" comes from Rule l0b-5 promulgated under the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934. 165 The representation, following the

165.
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general anti-fraud language of Rule l0b-5, provides that the acquisition
agreement "does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or
omit to state any material fact necessary to make the statement contained
herein not misleading." Such a representation broadens the applicability
of the other representations and does not merely duplicate the rules
provided by the securities laws with respect to the transfer of corporate
stock. Mere duplication does not occur because of the prima facie case
required, and the defenses (including those provided by the applicable
statutes of limitations) available with respect to the statutory rules differ
from those applicable by contract. In fact, the seller will usually wish
to demand language indicating that the buyer has had the opportunity to
perform due diligence, is satisfied with the results, and, most importantly, can refuse to close based only on the untruth of the representations
and warranties made in the agreement (at signing and, to the extent
provided in the bring-down condition, again at closing). In addition, the
seller should seek to include language by which the acquiror explicitly
acknowledges that it understands that it is not to rely on anything not
contained within the agreement and related disclosure schedule, even if
provided to the acquiror during the due diligence investigation.
However, it is generally appropriate for a seller that is a public company
to make a representation that its filings with the Securities and Exchange
Commission "did not, at the time they were filed, contain any untrue
statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact required to
be stated therein or necessary in order to make the statements therein, in
light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading."
In effect, the seller is representing that it has complied with duties
imposed on it by the securities laws as a result of its status as a public
company. This representation will usually be accompanied by a
representation that such filings were in proper form and otherwise
prepared and filed in accordance with the securities laws.

C.

Antitrust Issues

The Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act requires parties
involved in certain types of business combination transactions to supply
specific information to the Antitrust Division of the Department of
Justice and the Federal Trade Commission prior to the consummation of
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a merger. 166 Such information will be used in determining whether the
proposed transaction will have any anti-competitive effects that would
require the transaction to be terminated or restructured.
Depending on the level of risk that the combined company may be
required to divest certain assets, the seller may wish to include language
in the acquisition agreement that binds the purchaser to go through with
the transaction notwithstanding such requirements (a "hell or high water"
provision) or that otherwise sets, in advance, a threshold of what the
purchaser is willing to do. The purchaser may be unwilling to agree to
a "hell or high water" requirement for fear that, once the regulatory
authorities know that it has agreed to do anything it takes to complete
the transaction, the purchaser will lose all of its bargaining power with
respect to the regulators.

166.
(1994).
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Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976, 15 U.S.C. § !Sa

